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People use information on how often events occur as the basis for many decisions
they must make. For example, it has been shown that people will credit a statement as
being more true the more frequently they have heard it. Additionally, probability
information derived from observations of the frequency of occurrence of events has been
shown to play a role in concept formation.
One of the primary controversies in the study of how individuals process frequency
information revolves around the contention that the encoding of frequency information is an
automatic process (one that requires little or no attentional capacity and does not interfere
with the performance of other tasks) as opposed to a controlled process (one that requires
considerable attentional capacity and does interfere with the performance of other tasks).
Considerable research has addressed the issue of whether frequency information is encoded
automatically. Much of this research has focused on those variables which should not
affect the encoding of frequency information if this process were in fact automatic as
asserted by Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) (e.g., age of subjects, expectancy of upcoming
frequency test, and attentional capacity).
The results of research addressing the automaticity of the process required for
encoding frequency information in memory have been mixed. Therefore, in the current
study, meta-analyses were conducted for each of the variables with the potential to
influence the encoding of frequency information (cognitive ability, expected test, strategy,
levels of processing, age, capacity, encoding variability, practice, and generation). Within
each of the meta-analyses, characteristics of the individual studies which may have

xi

mediated that studies results were recorded and analyzed (type of dependent task, type of
dependent measure reported, test expectancy, type of stimuli used in the study, and the
number of to-be-remembered items in the study list).
Results of the meta-analyses indicated that (a) the frequency information encoded
when different processing strategies are used is different from the frequency information
encoded when no processing strategies, or less beneficial processing strategies, are used,
(b) the encoding of frequency information is not invariant to developmental differences later
in life, and (c) limiting the encoding capacity of individuals attempting to encode frequency
information interferes with this encoding. These results are inconsistent with the automatic
view of frequency information encoding. Furthermore, analyses of the study
characteristics revealed several problems of methodological interest.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Making judgments of how often events have occurred is a task which we perform
routinely in our daily lives (eg., it rained three times last month). Frequency information is
also necessary for other types of cognitive tasks. For example, people use their
observations of the frequency of occurrence of events to judge how probable or true a
particular event may be (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Hasher, Zacks, Rose, & Sanft, 1987).
Additionally, probability information derived from observations of frequency has been
shown to play a role in concept formation, in both children and adults (Sokal, 1977; Rosch
& Mervis, 1975).
The study of frequency judgment grew out of research which found effects of
repetition (i.e., frequency) in recall tasks, recognition tasks, and verbal discrimination
learning tasks (Freund & Witte, 1986; Ghatala, Levin, & Wilder, 1973; Harris, Begg, &
Mitterer, 1980). Currently, the primary controversies in this research area focus on how
frequency information is represented in memory and how people encode this information
(Greene, 1988). The first of these controversies revolves around the contention that
frequency information is obtained directly from a unique frequency attribute (Begg, 1974;
Begg, Maxwell, Mitterer, & Harris, 1986; Harris et al., 1980) as opposed to derived from
memory traces of repeated events (Estes, 1976; Hintzman, 1976; Hintzman & Block,
1971). The second of these controversies revolves around the contention that the encoding
of frequency information is an automatic process (one that requires little or no attentional
capacity and does not interfere with the performance of other tasks) (Hasher & Zacks,
1979, 1984) as opposed to a controlled process (one that requires considerable attentional
capacity and does interfere with the performance of other tasks) (Fisk, 1986).

3

4
The focus of the present research is the second of these two controversies.
Considerable research has addressed the issue of whether frequency information is encoded
automatically (Flexser & Bower, 1975; Fisk & Schneider, 1984; Greene, 1988; Hasher &
Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hintzman & Block, 1971; Sanders, Gonzalez,
Murphy, Liddle, & Vitina, 1990; Sanders, Wise, Liddle, & Murphy, 1987; Warren &
Mitchell, 1980; Wiggs, 1993). Much of this research has focused on variables which
should not affect the encoding of frequency information if this process were in fact
automatic (e.g., age of subjects, expectancy of upcoming frequency test, and attentional
capacity) (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Greene, 1984; Sanders et al., 1987; Sanders et al,
1990; Warren & Mitchell, 1980). Other research has attempted to address the question
concerning the uniqueness of frequency information as well as the question concerning the
automaticity of the process for encoding that information. For example, Greene (1988)
manipulated variables known to have an effect on recognition and recall (e.g., generation of
to-be-remembered items) to determine the extent to which frequency judgments rely on
similar or different memory information, and to determine the extent to which frequency
information is encoded automatically (generation should not affect frequency judgment).
Additionally, some researchers (Greene, 1986) have administered tasks which would
compete with the encoding of frequency information if it were not a unique attribute of
memory (e.g., requiring subjects to memorize distractor digits).
The results of research addressing the automaticity of the process required for
encoding frequency information in memory have been mixed. For example, some
researchers have found that intention to encode frequency information affects subsequent
frequency judgments (Greene, 1984; Greene, 1986, Exp. 1; Sanders et al., 1987), while
others have failed to find such effects (Attig & Hasher, 1980; Flexser & Bower, 1975;
Howell, 1973b). Furthermore, Hasher and Zacks (1979, Exp. 3) found no effects of
limited encoding capacity on later frequency judgments, but Birabaum, Taylor, Johnson,
and Raye (1987) did find effects of limited encoding capacity on frequency judgments.
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Due to the inconsistency of these and other research results (e.g., Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves,
1988; Kausler, Wright, & Hakami, 1981), a comprehensive quantitative review of the
frequency literature was deemed useful to identify those variables which do typically
influence the encoding of frequency information. Therefore, in the current study, metaanalytic techniques were used to review the frequency literature addressing the issue of
automaticity. More specifically, in an effort to develop a better understanding of how the
literature to date would collectively address controversy in this area, meta-analyses were
conducted for each of the variables with the potential to influence the encoding of frequency
information.

CHAPTER 2
Review of the Literature
Three major theoretical positions have provided a framework for addressing the
nature of the encoding of frequency information and the uniqueness of the representation of
frequency information in memory (Howell, 1973a). The first of these positions is the
classical view of the learning process, the trace-strength hypothesis. This theory states that
the representation of an event in memory increases in strength with repeated exposures to
the event. Frequency judgments, according to this general framework, would be made by
assessing the strength of the internal memory representation for the event (Howell, 1973a).
The second major theoretical position is the multiple-trace hypothesis. There are
two main versions of this hypothesis both of which assume that repeated exposures to an
event will produce multiple memory traces for the event that are distinguishable by either
contextual or temporal information (Hintzman & Block, 1971). According to these
multiple-trace hypotheses, frequency judgments are made by assessing the number of
contextually or temporally unique traces which have been produced for an event ( Anderson
& Bower, 1972; Bernbach, 1969; Bower, 1967; Hintzman, 1971).
Two types of multiple-trace theories on the memory for frequency information have
been proposed (Estes, 1976; Hintzman, 1976; Hintzman & Block, 1971; Whitlow & Estes,
1979). The first version of these is the limited-capacity model developed by Estes (1976)
and Whitlow and Estes (1979). This model assumes that in any given experimental
situation, there is a limited number of contextual or temporal tags which may be paired with
a memory trace and that only one event memory trace may be paired with one contextual
tag. Furthermore, according to this model, once the limit of contextual tags has been
reached, generation of new memory traces requires the destruction of old ones. The most
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currently accepted version of the multiple-trace theories is the unlimited capacity model as
proposed by Hintzman and Block (1971). This model assumes that there is no limit to the
number of temporally or contextually marked "tags" which distinguish multiple memory
traces. Furthermore, this model does not limit the number of memory traces for different
events that can be paired with the same contextual item. Both of these multiple-trace
theories would predict that processes which facilitate encoding or which result in a richer
memory trace (e.g., semantic elaboration) would subsequently facilitate retrieval and
frequency judgment.
A third theoretical position from which to view the representation of frequency in
memory has been proposed by Begg (1974). Begg elaborated on an idea originally
mentioned by Underwood (1969) in his description of the frequency-attribute hypothesis.
This hypothesis stresses the uniqueness of a frequency attribute which is associated with
events in memory. More specifically, events or items which are to be encoded are
collections of the attributes of those items. The memory trace of any item is the sum of
these attributes. A unique frequency attribute increases in strength as the frequency of
presentation increases. According to this theory, the frequency judgment is based upon the
"read out" of the "frequency counter" (Begg, 1974).
Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) have extended Begg's frequency-attribute
hypothesis. In accordance with that hypothesis, they contend that the memory for an event
consists of a collection of attributes for the event, one of which is frequency. Moreover,
unlike the multiple-trace hypotheses and the trace strength hypothesis, they contend that
frequency information is encoded automatically (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984). Whereas
the multiple-trace theories predict that strategic processes such as semantic elaboration
enhance encoding of frequency information, the frequency-attribute hypothesis as proposed
by Hasher and Zacks predicts that strategic processes would have no effect on the encoding
of the frequency information since such encoding is an automatic process which runs to
completion once initiated (Hasher & Zacks, 1984).
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In addressing this notion of automaticity, Hasher and Zacks (1984) have noted that
there is a continuum of capacity and intention requirements for the encoding of information.
At either end of this continuum lie the automatic and effortful processes, with the effortful
processes requiring extensive capacity and intention, and the automatic processes requiring
minimal capacity and minimal intention (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984; Hintzman & Stern,
1978). Additionally, Hasher and Zacks (1984) have noted that individuals have a limited
capacity for the processing of mental events, that individuals systematically differ in the
amount of capacity they have available for mental processing, and that mental processes
themselves differ in the amount of capacity they require.
From their observations on the nature of controlled and automatic processes Hasher
and Zacks (1984) have developed six criteria, all of which must be met, in order for a
process to be considered to occur automatically. Since Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984)
have asserted that the encoding of frequency information is an automatic process, these
criteria are presented as they pertain to frequency encoding. First, individuals will be
sensitive to the frequency information without necessarily intending to be. Second,
frequency information will be the same whether it is encoded automatically or intentionally.
Third, neither training nor explicit feedback concerning the encoding of frequency
information will improve an individual's ability to encode this information. Fourth,
individuals will differ very little in their capability to encode frequency information (e.g.,
more intelligent people will be no better than less intelligent people at encoding this
information). Fifth, an individual's age will not affect his or her ability to encode
frequency information. Sixth, disturbances in mental processing such as stress or
emotional arousal will not effect the encoding of frequency information (Hasher & Zacks,
1979, 1984).
These criteria for the automaticity of encoding event frequency have been used as a
framework from which to develop variables whose influence on frequency judgments
could be examined in order to either support or refute the notion of automaticity of
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encoding for frequency information. Among these variables are intellectual differences of
the participants, type of upcoming test which participants expect, the strategy or level of
processing which the participants are induced to use, age of the participants, the processing
capacity of the participants, the variability of the encoding episode, and the amount of
practice the participants have at encoding frequency information. These areas are briefly
reviewed below.
As noted earlier, much of this research offers disparate results as to which variables
do and which variables do not influence the encoding of frequency information.
Differences in cognitive capabilities have been shown, in some instances, to have no effects
on an individual's frequency judgments for words (Ellis & Allison, 1988; Kausler &
Puckett, 1980). However, Ellis, Palmer, and Reeves (1988) have demonstrated that
retarded individuals are deficient in processing word frequency information. Further
discrepancy occurs over whether frequency judgments for pictures are influenced by
cognitive capabilities. Both Ellis, Palmer, and Reeves (1988), and Lund, Hall, Wilson,
and Humphreys (1983) have failed to find effects of cognitive ability in the judging of
event frequency for pictures. However, Ellis and Allison (1988) have found that
nonretarded individuals are superior to retarded individuals in the accuracy of their
frequency judgments for pictures. Researchers concentrating on the effects of cognitive
ability on frequency encoding have tended to use brain damaged participants as the less
mentally able group (Nichelli, Appollonio, Clark, & Grafman, 1994; Vakil, Biederman,
Liran, Groswaser, & Aberbuch, 1994). Studies using this manipulation, however, may
not be testing the validity of Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) criteria for automatic
encoding. Qualifying the contention that the automatic process of frequency encoding
should function identically no matter what the cognitive ability (defined as intelligence) of
the individual, Hasher and Zacks (1979) stated that this was true only of individuals
without brain damage.
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Some of the research to date (e.g., Kausler & Puckett, 1980) has supported Hasher
and Zacks' (1979, 1984) claim that encoding events either with or without the intention to
encode the frequency of occurrence of those events produces equivalent memorial
representations for the frequency of occurrence of the events. However, other research
has failed to support the contention that frequency information is encoded just as well
without the intention to encode frequency information as with the intention to encoded
frequency information (e.g., Greene, 1984; Kausler, Lichty, & Hakami, 1984; Sanders et
al., 1987). Moreover, Greene (1986) has made the claim that in the study of the
automaticity of frequency encoding it is not intentionality itself that is interesting, but the
encoding strategies which participants use as a result of their differing intentions. It is
assumed that those participants given full frequency test instructions adopt a different
processing strategy than those who are not given full frequency test instructions.
Several methods have been used to assess the effects of strategy adoption on the
encoding of frequency information. Some researchers have compared the frequency
judgments of participants who are required to use different memory strategies (Greene,
1986, Exp. 3; Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982). For example, Zacks, Hasher, and Sanft
(1982) have found a small but significant advantage in the frequency judgments for those
participants who had been told to use a counting strategy as opposed to those not given
strategy information.
Other researchers have employed different orienting tasks which induce participants
to process certain aspects of the stimulus materials and not others (Challis, 1993, Exp. 1;
Maki & Ostby, 1987). Specifically, the orienting tasks may require participants to encode
the stimulus materials either semantically, acoustically, or structurally. In this depth of
processing manipulation, it has been shown that semantic processing results in a superior
memory trace as opposed to acoustic and structural processing which are progressively less
effective processing strategies (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). For example, Maki and Ostby
(1987, Exp. 1), Jonides and Naveh-Benjamin (1987, Exp. 1), and Greene (1986, Exp. 3)
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have found that deeper levels of processing (e.g., processing of semantic characteristics
versus processing of structural characteristics) leads to improved frequency judgments.
Research on the influence of depth of processing converges on the conclusion that such
manipulations influence subsequent frequency judgments. These results and the results
from the research on processing strategies are inconsistent with the criteria posed by
Hasher and Zacks (1984). More specifically, research results obtained from levels of
processing manipulations are consistent with the multiple-trace hypothesis in that strategic
processing results in richer encoding of contextual information. Therefore, it would be
interesting to determine the typical size of the effect that is seen in the manipulation of
processing strategy and in the manipulation of depth of processing.
Since deeper semantic processing leads to superior contextual encoding and thus to
improved frequency judgments, and since elderly adults and children are less likely to
engage in unprompted semantic processing (Craik & Rabinowitz, 1985; Hasher & Clifton,
1974), it would seem reasonable to expect to see developmental differences in individuals'
frequency judgments. However, research results concerning the effects of developmental
differences are also mixed. While some developmental research has found that young
adults perform better than older adults (those over 55) on frequency judgment tasks
(Kausler, Lichty, & Hakami, 1981; Kausler, Salthouse, & Saults, 1987; Kausler, Wright,
& Hakami, 1984, Exp. 1 & Exp. 2; Tweedy & Vakil, 1988; Warren & Mitchell, 1980),
other research has failed to find such a difference between these two age groups (Attig &
Hasher, 1980; Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves, 1988, Exp. 1; Hasher & Zacks, 1979, Exp. 1;
Kausler & Puckett, 1980; Sanders, Wise, Liddle, & Murphy, 1990). Furthermore,
developmental research on frequency judgments for pictures using children as participants
has revealed differences in the frequency judgments between kindergartners, first graders,
and older school-aged children (Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves, 1988, Exp. 2). However,
Hasher and Zacks (1979, Exp. 1) found that the slopes of the frequency judgments for
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children in the kindergarten through the third grade were virtually identical and did not
significantly differ.
Another manipulation which would appear to enhance the encoding of frequency
information if it were based upon multiple contextually tagged traces, rather than the
automatic frequency counter as Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) have proposed, is
increasing the discriminability of the individual encoding episodes. Some studies
manipulating the variability of the encoding episode have presented stimulus words paired
with varying numbers of semantic associates on each occurrence of the stimulus item or
with the same associate on each occurrence of stimulus item (Jonides & Naveh-Benjamin,
1987, Exp. 3). Other studies manipulating the variability of the encoding episode have
required subjects to rate the stimulus word on one to five adjective scales (Penney &
Balsom, 1993). Like the research on other variables which should not influence the
encoding of frequency information if it were in fact an automatic process, the research on
the variability of the encoding episode has been mixed. In fact, while some researchers
have found a significant benefit for increased variability of the encoding episode (Begg et
al., 1986, Exp. 1; Brown, 1995, Exp. 3), other researchers have found that increasing the
variability of the encoding episode actually causes a significant decrease in the accuracy of
frequency judgments (Brown, 1995, Exp. 1; Hintzman & Stern, 1978, Exp. 2).
While one of the most interesting and perhaps most essential of Hasher and Zacks'
(1984) criteria is that limiting or taxing an individual's processing capacity will not affect
the encoding of frequency information, little research has actually been done manipulating
processing capacity. Nonetheless, even the results of the research in this area are disparate.
Hasher and Zacks (1979, Exp. 3) concluded that depressed subjects, who are thought to
have a limited capacity to encode information, were no different than nondepressed subjects
in judging the presentation frequency of pictures. However, Birnbaum, Taylor, Johnson,
and Raye (1987) have found that those subjects who were alcohol intoxicated at the time of
encoding performed more poorly on the frequency judgment task than did those subjects
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who were not alcohol intoxicated. Based on the research which has shown that alcohol
intoxication reduces encoding capacity (Craik, 1977), this result contradicts that of Hasher
and Zacks (1979, Exp. 3). Other researchers who have reduced encoding capacity by
direct experimental manipulations (Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986; Mutter & Goedert,
1996) have found that as the complexity of the task competing for processing resources
increases, the accuracy of frequency judgments decreases. While these research results
contradict the assumptions of the automaticity of frequency encoding, they could be viewed
in light of the multiple-trace hypothesis, since a reduction in encoding capacity would
reduce the encoding of contextual information.
Finally, concerning Hasher and Zacks1 (1979, 1980) contention that the encoding
of frequency information will not improve as a result of practice, Hockley (1984) found
that frequency estimation did indeed improve with practice, while Zacks, Hasher, and Sanft
(1982) found that performance on a frequency judgment task did not improve with practice.
In addition to the variables derived from Hasher and Zacks' (1979, 1984) criteria
for automaticity, another variable has been found to influence the encoding of the frequency
with which events occur. Research results have suggested that inducing subjects to
generate items internally produces confusion in estimating the frequency of items presented
externally (Raye, Johnson, & Taylor, 1980; Johnson, Taylor, & Raye, 1977). Moreover,
some of the same research has found "generation effects"; that is an advantage forjudging
the frequency of information which is internally generated over information which is
externally presented (Raye et al., 1980).
Due to the discrepancies in many of the research results addressing the automaticity
of the encoding of frequency information (e.g., Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves, 1988; Kausler,
Wright, & Hakami, 1988), a comprehensive quantitative review of the frequency literature
was deemed necessary to identify those variables which do typically influence the encoding
of frequency information. In the current study, a meta-analysis was conducted for each of
the variables found to affect frequency judgment (cognitive ability, expected test, strategy,
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levels of processing, age, capacity, encoding variability, practice, and generation). To
account for further variability in the results of the independent studies, additional analyses
were conducted on sets of hypothesis tests as grouped by coded predictor variables (e.g.,
type of dependent measure, type of instructions, length of study list, type of stimuli, and
type of frequency judgment task - discrimination or estimation).
It was expected that collectively the meta-analyses would yield results inconsistent
with the notion that the encoding of the frequency of occurrence of events is an automatic
process as currently defined by Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984). Furthermore, consistent
with a nonautomatic view of the encoding of frequency information, it was expected that
the analyses would demonstrate that individuals' frequency judgments (a) deteriorate as
their mental ability declines, (b) benefit from the intention to encode frequency
information, (c) benefit from the use of a processing strategy , (d) benefit from deeper
levels of processing, (e) deteriorate as they age in late adulthood, (f) deteriorate as their
capacity to encode frequency information is taxed, (g) benefit from greater encoding
variability, (h) benefit from practice at encoding frequency information, and (i) increase as
a result of internally generating study items. Support for these hypotheses would lend
credence to the notion that the encoding of frequency information is not an automatic
process.

CHAPTER 3
Method
An independent meta-analysis was conducted on each set of hypothesis tests of
variables thought to mediate the encoding of frequency judgments: (a) cognitive ability, (b)
test expectancy, (c) strategies which facilitate intentional frequency encoding, (d) strategies
which induce differing levels of processing, (e) age of the subjects, (f) capacity of subjects
to encode frequency information, (g) practice at encoding frequency information, (h)
discriminability of to-be-remembered items at the time of encoding, and (i) internal
generation versus external presentation of to-be-remembered items.
Three theoretical questions were statistically addressed for each of the individual
meta-analyses carried out on the variables above. All of the steps indicated in addressing
these questions were followed for each of the independent meta-analyses. The first
question addressed for each meta-analysis was "What is the typical effect seen in the
literature for this particular variable?". The second question addressed was "What is the
variability around the typical outcome in the literature for this particular variable?" (Mullen,
1989). Finally, the last question addressed for each of the meta-analyses was "How can
the variability around the typical effect be explained?".
Retrieval of Studies
Whenever one undertakes the task of performing a meta-analysis, there is the
concern that the published literature from which a sample is drawn reflects a bias for the
publication of only significant results (Mullen, 1989). In the current literature addressing
the issue of the automaticity of frequency encoding, however, both significant and
nonsignificant results are of interest and are publishable since both types of results provide
evidence either for or against frequency encoding as an automatic process. Despite the
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apparent punishability of both significant and nonsignificant results in this research area,
precautions were taken to ensure that the literature included in the meta-analyses does not
reflect a publication bias. These precautions are delineated throughout the description of
the methods to be used in this study.
Three methods were used to retrieve studies with the potential to be included in the
meta-analyses. The first of these methods is the use of abstracting services and on-line
computer databases. Those databases which were searched include Psychlnfo, PsychLit,
ArticleList, and Dissertation Abstracts. Use of the Dissertation Abstracts as a means of
obtaining unpublished research articles is one precaution which was taken against retrieving
a literature base with a publication bias. Searches in all of the databases were conducted on
the key words "frequency" and "judgment" as well as "frequency" and "monitoring." The
second method used in the retrieval of studies was the method of ancestry. This method
involves making use of the reference sections of articles in the frequency literature in an
effort to obtain references for earlier frequency studies. In addition to the method of
ancestry, the method of the descendency was used to retrieve studies. Descendency
involves the use of the indexes to obtain more recent articles in the frequency literature
which have cited previously published frequency articles (Mullen, 1989). In particular,
Science Citation Index was used to retrieve those studies which have cited either Hasher
and Zacks' 1979 or 1984 article.
Criteria for Inclusion of Studies
A retrieved study was included in the meta-analyses only when it met all of the
following three criteria. First, the dependent variable of the study must have been an
explicit frequency estimation task (one in which the subject provides an estimate of
frequency of occurrence for presented items) or an explicit frequency discrimination task
(one in which the subject chooses the most or least frequent of two items).
Second, the study must have manipulated at least one of the following variables: (a)
cognitive ability of the participants, (b) test expectancy, (c) processing strategies used by
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the participants, (d) strategies which induce differing levels of processing, (e) age of the
subjects, (f) capacity to encode frequency information, (g) discriminability of to-beremembered items at time of encoding, (h) practice at encoding the frequency information,
or (i) internal generation of to-be-remembered items.
Finally, those studies whose hypothesis tests involve F and Chi-square statistics
with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator were excluded if the information
required to recreate the appropriate statistic was not obtainable. F and Chi-square statistics
with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator would be meaningless for the
purposes of the present study since they represent overall tests of significant differences
between more than two groups. When the information was obtainable, the omnibus F test
was broken down into simple comparisons as delineated by Rosenthal and Rosnow
(1984). Further discussion of this procedure is provided in the statistical test retrieval
section.
Coding of Predictor Variables
In addition to the variables which the authors of the respective studies manipulate,
there may be other characteristics of the studies which, though not manipulated, affect the
results of the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analyses (Mullen, 1989). To assess the
existence of this additional variability and to aid in explaining the typical effects and the
typical variability which is seen in the frequency literature, several variables were coded for
each of the studies included in the analyses. For each hypothesis test in which these
variables were not manipulated, the following variables were coded: (a) the type of
dependent task (i.e. frequency estimation or frequency discrimination), (b) the type of
dependent measure reported (e.g., mean frequency estimate, correlation between
presentation and judged frequency), (c) the type of instructions given to subjects (e.g.,
frequency test, general memory test, incidental learning), (d) the type of stimuli used in the
study (e.g., English words, nonsense syllables, pictures), and (e) the number of to-be-
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remembered items in the study list. For a summary of the levels which were coded for
each categorical predictor variable see Table A1 (in Appendix A).
Further clarification on how several of the predictors were coded is necessary. In
the coding of dependent measure, those studies that reported their results in terms of mean
correct/incorrect, percent correct/incorrect, or number correct/incorrect were coded as
"number correct/incorrect." Those studies using the mean frequency judgment in their
analyses were coded as "mean frequency." Those studies reporting either the correlation
between judged and actual frequency or the slope of the regression of actual onto judged
frequency were coded together as "correlation/slope." Correlational measures and
regression slope measures were coded together since each gives a measure of participants'
sensitivity to frequency as actual presentation frequency increases. Lastly, those studies
which used mean of median frequency judgments in the analyses were coded as "mean
medians."
In the coding of the type of instructions given to the participants, instructions were
labeled "frequency" if participants in the respective studies were explicitly told of the
upcoming frequency task prior to receiving the study list. Instructions were labeled as
"general memory" if participants were either warned of an unspecified, but upcoming
memory test or if they were warned of a recall test. Lastly, instructions were labeled as
"incidental learning" if participants were not informed of any upcoming memory test and if
the study list was presented in such a way that the participants would not have presupposed
that their memory for the study list would be tested.
In the coding of stimuli, studies which used words in the participants' native
language as stimuli were coded as "native language words." Studies using pictures or
some geometric figures as stimuli were coded as "pictures/figures." Studies using some
arrangement of letters that were not words in the participants' native language were coded
"nonsense syllables."
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In addition to those predictors coded in all of the meta-analyses, several unique
predictors were coded in certain meta-analyses. These are depicted in Table A2 (Appendix
A). Studies investigating how varying cognitive abilities affect the encoding of frequency
information used participants from various special populations with cognitive deficiencies
and compared their performance with that of normal subjects on frequency judgment tasks.
The type of population used was coded under the predictor "cognitive ability" and the
special populations which were coded for are listed in Table A2 (Appendix A). In the
meta-analysis for studies manipulating participants' test expectancy, researchers could have
made comparisons between participants' performance under three types of instructions,
frequency test instructions, general memory test instructions, or no memory test
instructions (i.e. incidental). The type of comparison made was coded for in the metaanalysis on test expectancy. Likewise, in those studies which manipulated the type of
strategy which the participants were induced to use, researchers may have made
comparisons between two of several types of strategies (e.g., counting vs. imagery). The
type of strategy comparison was coded for each of the individual hypothesis tests. In those
studies which manipulated the depth of processing of the stimulus materials, researchers
could have made comparisons between participants' performance under three types of
orienting tasks, semantic, acoustic, or structural. The type of depth of processing
comparison which was made was coded for in the meta-analysis on levels of processing.
Additionally, in the meta-analysis on the effects of age for children, some studies made
developmental comparisons between children of different ages, while other studies made
developmental comparisons between children and young adults. Therefore, the type of
developmental comparison made was coded for in the meta-analysis on the effects of age
for children. Those studies which were included in the meta-analysis on the effects of
limiting participants' processing capacity at the time of stimulus encoding utilized different
means of limiting this capacity. Therefore, the type of capacity limitation placed on the
participants was coded for in this meta-analysis. Finally, studies manipulating the effects
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of practice on participants' frequency judgment performance either gave multiple study and
test lists to participants within one testing session or gave multiple study and test lists to
participants across several sessions. Hence, the type of practice manipulation was coded
for in the meta-analysis on the effects of practice.
Equipment
Statistical test transformations and meta-analytic procedures were carried out using
Advanced BASIC Meta-Analysis. This is a database management system and statistical
package created by Brian Mullen, Syracuse University, for the purpose of conducting those
statistical techniques necessitated by a meta-analysis.
Statistical Test Retrieval and Transformation
Statistical Test Retrieval
For each of the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analyses it was necessary to
collect the size of the sample, the type of test statistic reported, the value of the test statistic,
and the degrees of freedom associated with the test statistic. Studies were allowed to
contribute more than one hypothesis test to different meta-analyses. For example, if one
experiment assessed the influence of age and test expectancy on frequency judgments, the
hypothesis test for the influence of age would be included in the meta-analysis for the
effects of age, and the hypothesis test for the influence of test expectancy would be
included in the meta-analysis for the effects of test expectancy. Studies were also allowed
to contribute multiple independent hypothesis tests to the same meta-analysis. For
example, if one experiment examined the influence of a target variable on both frequency
estimation and frequency discrimination tasks such that different groups of participants
performed each task, then the test statistic associated with performance on the estimation
task as well as the test statistic associated with performance on the discrimination task was
included in the meta-analysis.
When type of dependent task was manipulated within participants in a particular
study (i.e., the same group of individuals receive both a frequency estimation task and a
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frequency discrimination task), the results from the frequency estimation task were retained
for the analysis, since it is a more precise measure of frequency judgment. When multiple
dependent measures derived from performance on a single test were used to report the
outcome of a hypothesis test (e.g., primary-level analyses were conducted on both the
mean correlation between presentation frequency and judged frequency as well as on the
mean frequency estimates), the most sophisticated and most sensitive measure was chosen
for inclusion in the meta-analysis. In most cases, the correlation between presentation
frequency and judged frequency is the analysis most sensitive to subjects' actual sensitivity
to frequency information and least sensitive to individual differences in the magnitude of
frequency estimates.
Those hypothesis tests which were reported in terms of an omnibus F statistic with
more than one degree of freedom in the numerator were broken down into tests of specific
hypotheses when the means for the levels of the independent variable of interest and the
MSerror for the omnibus F were obtainable. This was done, as Rosenthal and Rosnow
(1984) have described, by using a t test to examine the significance of a specific hypothesis
concerning two levels of the independent variable of interest:
t = -Mi

M2

*y(l/ni + l/n2) s 2
In this instance, S2 is an estimate of error pooled over all conditions in the original
omnibus F test and is therefore equal to the MSerror- The degrees of freedom
corresponding to the t test using the pooled variance is based upon the entire sample and
not just the two means used in the specific comparison. The mean for any level of the
independent variable was not used in more than one comparison.
For those hypothesis tests for which the original test statistic was unobtainable and
unable to be recreated, conservative estimates of the study outcomes were made.
Information concerning when such estimates were necessary is presented in the tables of
the studies contained in each of the respective meta-analyses. In the absence of a test
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statistic, reports of "no significant effect" were estimated to be g=.50 and Z=0.000. It was
necessary to make this estimation for 32 hypothesis tests. Likewise, in the absence of a
test statistic, reports of a "significant effect" were estimated to be p=.05 and Z= 1.645
(Mullen, 1989). It was necessary to make this estimation for 3 hypothesis tests.
Statistical Test Transformation
For the purpose of the meta-analyses, all statistical tests were transformed into the
common metric Z and the measure of effect size, r. Inferential statistics were transformed
into Zs as indicated by Table A3 (see Appendix A) and into rs as indicated by Table A 4 .
Because r becomes nonlinear at its extreme values (James, Demaree, & Mulaik,
1986), it was transformed into a standardized value, Fisher's Z (ZftSHER). This
transformation was obtained using the following formula (Mullen, 1989):
ZFISHER = -5{log[(l + r) / (1

r)]}

Additionally, an estimate of effect size, d, the standardized difference between means, was
computed as follows (Mullen, 1989):
d = [(4r2)/(l-r2)]l/2
The standardized difference between means provides the reader with an easily interpretable
way to evaluate the effects sizes of the hypothesis tests included in each of the metaanalyses. Cohen (1988) has provided some guidelines by which to judge the magnitude of
effect sizes. Particularly, effect sizes of d=.20 are small effects, effects sizes of d=.50 are
medium effects, and effect sizes of d=.80 are large effects (Cohen, 1988).
Meta-Analyses of Study Outcomes
All of the following procedures were carried out on each set of studies which
manipulated one of the variables of interest in the investigation of the automaticity of
frequency encoding (i.e., all of the following procedures were carried out independently on
the studies investigating effects of age, and again on the studies investigating the effects of
processing strategy, etc.).
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Disjoint Cluster Analysis
Prior to statistically investigating the typical effect size and the variability of the
studies around the typical effect size, it was ensured that the samples on which the metaanalyses were based could be considered to have been drawn from the same population. In
an effort to identify nonoverlapping clusters of study outcomes which significantly differ
from one another, a disjoint cluster analysis based on effect size and sample size was
conducted. In the disjoint cluster analysis, the ZFISHER associated with each test statistic
was rank ordered and weighted by a square-mean-root estimate of common sample size
(Mullen, 1989). The formula for this procedure, which yields the standard normal variate
U is as follows:

where: Nj = N associated with hypothesis test j
ZFISHER = ZFISHER associated with the effect size for hypothesis test j
k = number of hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis
Once this procedure was completed, adjacently ranked Us were examined for significant
differences. When the difference between adjacently ranked Us was greater than or equal
to the critical value with significance of g=.05, the hypotheses tests corresponding to these
Us were placed in different clusters. If the difference did not exceed the established critical
value, the hypotheses tests corresponding to these Us were retained in the same cluster
(Mullen, 1989). Further analyses were conducted upon homogeneous clusters only.
Typical Effect Size
In order to determine the typical or average effect size seen in the literature both
significance levels and effect sizes were combined. Combination of significance levels
involved weighting each Z s ignificance (obtained from the statistical tests) by the size of the
sample and then averaging them. Significance levels were combined by the following
formula (Mullen, 1989):
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^significance - 2NjZj
2Nj2
where: Nj = sample size of hypothesis test j
Zj = Z associated with the significance level of hypothesis test j
The g value which corresponds to this combined Z is the likelihood that the results of the
included studies would have been obtained if the null hypothesis were indeed true.
As further evidence of the typical effect, effect sizes (ZpiSHER)

were

combined,

weighted by sample size. This meta-analytic combination procedure was be done by the
following formula (Mullen, 1989):
Zeffect = ZNjZFISHERj

where: Nj= sample size of the hypothesis test j
ZFISHERj = ZFISHER associated with the effect size for hypothesis test j
Test for Publication Bias
A calculation of the number of unretrieved studies averaging null results that would
be necessary to bring the combined significance level to g=.05 was calculated. This "failsafe number," originally described by Rosenthal (1979), was used as another defense
against publication bias. The formula for its calculation is as follows (Rosenthal, 1979):

where: Zj = Z associated with significance level of hypothesis test j
k = number of hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis
Rosenthal (1984; Rosenthal & Hall, 1981) has recommended a tolerable "fail-safe
number" of "5k + 10." This number was calculated for each of the meta-analyses.
As an additional test for publication bias, a funnel plot was constructed for each
meta-analysis. Funnel plots, originally described by Light and Pillemer (1984), are study
effect sizes (d) plotted as a function of sample size. If no publication bias exists in the
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literature collected for the meta-analysis, the plot would be expected to have the shape of an
inverted funnel, with those studies utilizing the largest sample size having the average or
most representative effect size (for an example see Figure 1). If a publication bias does
exist in the literature one would expect studies using small samples and yielding
nonsignificant results (i.e., the lower left corner of the inverted funnel) to be missing (for
an example see Figure 2).
Variability Around the Typical Effect Size
To determine the variability of the study outcomes around the typical effect size,
diffuse comparisons were made of both significance levels and effect sizes. The diffuse
comparison of significance levels estimates the probability that the p values of the included
studies differ significantly. It is a test of whether the significance levels are heterogeneous
and come from different populations or whether the significance levels are homogeneous
and can be assumed to come from the same population (Mullen, 1989). The formula for
the diffuse comparison of effect sizes is as follows (Mullen, 1989):
X 2 ( k-l) = 2 ( Z j - Z ) 2
where: Zj = Z associated with significance level of hypothesis test j
Z = mean Z
k = number of hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis
The diffuse comparison of effect sizes estimates the probability that the magnitude
of the effect sizes of the included studies differ significantly from one another (Mullen,
1989). Like the diffuse comparison of significance levels its is a test of the heterogeneity
of the magnitude of the effect sizes. The formula for the diffuse comparison of effect sizes
is as follows:
X2(k-1) = 2(Nj 3) (ZFISHERj - ZFISHER) 2
where: Nj = N associated with hypothesis test j
ZFISHER = ZFISHERj associated with hypothesis test j
ZFISHER = mean ZFISHER
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k = number of hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis
The g value based on the y} with (k - 1) degrees of freedom (for both the diffuse
comparison of significance levels and the diffuse comparison of effects sizes) is the
probability that at least one of the study outcomes significantly differs from another.
Explaining the Variability - Analysis of Coded Predictors
Additional variability in frequency judgments beyond that accounted for by the
independent variable may exist in the effect sizes of the studies included in the metaanalyses. It may be the case that the results obtained in the primary studies are better
explained by variables which the primary researchers did not consider. Furthermore,
characteristics of the studies which were not manipulated by primary researchers but which
were coded as predictor variables for the meta-analyses may be found to contribute to the
variability of frequency judgments. Therefore, after examination of the typical effect size
and the variability of effect sizes for each variable of interest, an analysis of the coded
predictors which were not manipulated in that set of studies was carried out in order to
explain the variability around the typical effect size. For example, the studies which were
included in the meta-analysis to test for the effects of age were analyzed for the effects of
the coded predictors: (a) type of dependent task, (b) type of dependent measure, (c) type of
instructions, (d) type of stimuli, and (e) length of study list.
For the only continuous predictor, list length, a correlation between Cohen's d and
study list length was conducted. A focused comparison of significance levels and effects
sizes assessing the extent to which these outcomes significantly varied with study list
length was also conducted. The formulas for these focused comparisons are equivalent to
those formulas used in the simple combination of significance levels and effect sizes for
each of the study outcomes, with the exception that rather than being weighted by sample
size, these comparisons are weighted by linear orthogonal polynomial contrasts (Mullen,
1989). Weighting by linear orthogonal polynomials investigates the extent to which the
levels of the coded predictor variables demonstrate a linear trend. In the case that the levels
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of the continuous predictor variable are distributed at unequal intervals, orthogonal contrast
weights that still assess linearity were derived from the procedure described by Kirk (1982,
Appendix C). Table A5 (Appendix A) illustrates the steps necessary to obtain the contrast
weights for a set of four studies using the continuous predictor mean age. Values of the
predictor represented in the table are for illustration purposes only.
For categorical predictors, significance levels and effect sizes were combined within
each level of the categorical predictor to obtain an average effect size and significance level
for each level of each categorical predictors. For example, in investigating the effects of the
categorical predictor "type of dependent measure," significance levels and effect sizes of
those studies using a frequency estimation task were combined using the methods
mentioned for the combination of study outcomes. Likewise, the significance levels and
effects sizes of those studies using a frequency discrimination task were combined using
those same methods. The formulas for the combination of significance levels and effect
sizes are equivalent to those used in the overall meta-analysis combinations. Additionally,
focused comparisons were conducted between the levels of the categorical predictor
variables.

CHAPTER 4
Results
In this study, it was expected that collectively the meta-analyses would yield results
inconsistent with the notion that the encoding of the frequency of occurrence of events is an
automatic process as currently defined by Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984). Moreover, it
was expected that the analyses would demonstrate that individual's frequency judgments
(a) deteriorate as their mental ability declines, (b) benefit from the intention to encode
frequency information, (c) benefit from processing strategies, (d) benefit from deeper
levels of processing, (e) deteriorate as they age in late adulthood, (f) deteriorate as their
capacity to encode frequency information is taxed, (g) benefit from greater encoding
variability, (h) benefit from practice at encoding frequency information, and (i) increase as
a result of internally generating study items.
For each of the analyses of typical effects, the aforementioned variables were
considered to have a significant influence on frequency judgment performance if the
following criteria were met: (a) the probability associated with the combination of
significance levels was less than or equal to .05, and (b) the fail-safe number associated
with the significance levels met Rosenthal's (1984) 5k+10 criteria. The probability
associated with the combination of the effect sizes was not used as a standard by which to
judge the importance of the influence of the variables mentioned above. In this literature
area it was not expected that group differences would exceed the one and half standard
deviations necessary to obtain significance for the effect sizes. However, small,
consistent, and stable group differences may be of either theoretical or practical relevance.
Therefore, if the results of the included studies were determined to have a low probability
of occurring by chance (as indicated by the probability associated with the combination of
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significance levels) and there was no evidence of a sampling bias (as indicated by the failsafe number), then the effect sizes were regarded as reflecting actual group differences,
whether they were large or small.
Regardless of the results of the overall combination of significance levels and effect
sizes, both diffuse and focused comparisons were conducted for the predictor variables. In
the course of performing these analyses, both significance levels and effect sizes associated
with the individual hypothesis tests were analyzed. On occasion, the probability level
associated with either the diffuse or focused comparisons based upon these two indices
differed. For example, a correlation of .97 may yield a large effect size, but if it is based
upon a sample of four, this effect, though large, would not be significant. Likewise, it is
possible that the individual hypothesis tests of the current meta-analyses reflect a similar
inconsistency. Therefore, when the probabilities associated with the comparisons based
upon significance levels and effect sizes differed, results were considered significant only if
the probability associated with the effect sizes was less than or equal to .01. The stricter
probability criteria (p < .01) was adopted since mutliple focused comparisons were
conducted.
Cognitive Ability
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the twelve hypothesis tests which were included in the metaanalysis on the effects of cognitive ability appear in Table B1 (see Appendix B). The
disjoint cluster analysis indicated that all of the twelve hypotheses tests fell together into
one homogeneous cluster . Moreover, the funnel plot of Cohen's d as a function of sample
size (see Figure 3) does not reflect a bias for the publication of significant results.
While the combination of the significance levels (Z s ignificance=l-98, p=.02)
indicated that differences in cognitive ability do exert an influence on frequency judgment
performance, the combination of effect sizes (Z e ffect=-10. d=.20) yielded only a small
effect (as characterized by Cohen, 1988) reflecting slightly more accurate frequency

30
judgment performance on the part of the control groups than that of the cognitively disabled
groups. Additionally, only fifteen unpublished studies supporting the null hypothesis
would be needed to overturn the combined significance level. This does not meet
Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the fail-safe number (in this case, 5k+10=70). Hence, it is
possible that the results obtained in this analysis are the product of a sampling bias. As a
result, the overall influence of cognitive ability cannot readily be interpreted. However, a
diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the effect sizes revealed that there
was significant variability in both (y2(]1)=31.62, g=.00, for significance levels; and
X2(ll)=34.46,

p=.00, for effect sizes).

Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels broken down by levels of
the categorical predictor variables for hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on
cognitive ability appears in Table 1. Focused comparisons between levels of the categorical
predictor variables based upon both significance levels and effect sizes appear in Table 2.
Only those comparisons which reached significance at g=.01 are presented in this table.
Both significance levels and effect sizes significantly varied as a function of the
dependent task required of the participants. Specifically, larger effect sizes were generated
when participants were required to perform a discrimination task than when they were
required to perform an estimation task. Note that for groups that performed frequency
discrimination tasks, this difference is confounded with differences in the cognitive ability
manipulations.
Moreover, significance levels and effect sizes also varied as a function of the
dependent measure that was employed by the primary researchers. As a measure of
frequency judgment, mean correct generated significantly larger effects sizes than both
correlation and mean frequency, which did not differ significantly from each other. The
difference between mean correct and other measures of frequency judgment is completely
contained within the type of frequency judgment task. Therefore, as was mentioned above,
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the effects of dependent measure are confounded with differences in cognitive ability
manipulations
There was no variation in either the effect sizes or the significance levels as a
function of either the stimuli that the researchers used or the type of test that the participants
expected. Additionally, neither the effect sizes nor the significance levels varied as a
function of study list length (see Table CI, Appendix C). There was, however, variability
in the effects sizes and significance levels as a function of the cognitive ability manipulation
used by the primary researchers.

Parkinson's patients, who on the whole actually

performed better than control groups, differed significantly from the aphasic patients and
the retarded individuals. Moreover, the aphasic patients also differed significantly from the
retarded patients and the closed head injured patients. Note that only those studies using
retarded individuals and aphasic individuals as the cognitively disabled group yielded
combined significance levels with probabilities of less than or equal to .01.
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Table

7

Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onSemanticVersusStructuralDepthofProcessing
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

d

Discrimination^)

3.50

.00

7.64

1.13

Estimation(lO)

1.24

.11

-5.95

0.11

Mean Correct(4)

4.08

.00

25.98

0.81

Mean Frequency(3)

0.00

.50

-3.00

0.00

Correlation/Slope(5)

0.10

.46

-4.87

-0.06

Native Language Words(7)

0.78

.22

-3.44

0.10

Pictures / Figures(3)

1.37

.08

-0.88

0.23

Frequency( 1)

1.48

.06

NA

0.28

General Memory(10)

1.64

.04

7.73

0.21

Retardation(6)

2.48

.00

5.02

0.31

Closed Head Injured(l)

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Parkinson's Disease(l)

-2.15

.98

NA

-0.82

Aphasic Patients(2)

3.50

.00

7.64

1.13

Frontal Lobectomy(l)

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Detoxified Alcoholics(l)

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test

Cognitive Ability Manipulation

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table 2
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for the Cognitive Ability Meta-Analysis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=3.17(p=.00)

Z=2.87(p=.00)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=3.83(p=.00)

Z=3.53(p=.00)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Frequency

Z=3.41(p=.00)

Z=2.94(p=.00)

Mean Frequency vs. Correlation

Z=.42(p=.34)

Z—. 16(p=.44)

Native Words vs. Pictures

Z=.00(p=.50)

Z=.45(p=.33)

Z=.04(p=.48)

Z=.76(p=.22)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Expected Test
Frequency vs. General Memory

Cognitive Ability Manipulation (Significant comparisons only)
Aphasics vs. Alcoholics

Z=2.64(p=.00)

Z=2.09(p=.01)

Aphasics vs. Frontal Lobectomy

Z=3.00(p=.00)

Z=2.09(p=.01)

Retarded vs. Aphasic

Z=2.50(p=.00)

Z=2.01(p=.02)

CHI vs. Aphasic

Z=2.24(p=.01)

Z=2.09(p=.01)

Parkinson's vs. Aphasia

Z=3.98(p=.00)

Z=3.84(p=.00)

Retardation vs Parkinson's

Z=2.65(p=.00)

Z=2.84(p=.00)

Expected Test
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the 27 hypothesis tests which were included in the meta-analysis
on the effects of test expectancy appear in Table B2 (see Appendix B). The disjoint cluster
analysis identified one outlier (Challis, 1993, Exp. 1). The remaining 26 hypothesis tests
fell together into one homogeneous cluster. The funnel plot of Cohen's d as a function of
sample size (see Figure 4) revealed that both large negative effects sizes were missing from
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the literature as well as moderate to large effect sizes for moderate sample sizes. It does
not, however, reflect a bias for the publication of significant results.
While the combination of significance levels (Zsignificance=3.11, p=.00) indicates
that individuals' test expectancy influenced frequency judgment performance, the
combination of effect sizes (Z e ffect= 06, d=.16), though reflecting slightly more accurate
frequency judgment performance for those individuals who expected an upcoming
frequency test, is extremely small (as described by Cohen, 1988). Furthermore, seventy
unpublished studies supporting the null hypothesis would be needed to overturn the
combined significance level. This number does not meet Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the
fail-safe number (in this case, 5k +10 = 140). Once again, it is possible that the obtained
results are the product of a sampling bias, and therefore, the influence of individuals' test
expectancy on frequency judgment performance cannot be interpreted on the basis of these
results. While a diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the effects sizes
indicated that there was no variability in either measure (x2(25)=29.04, p=.26, for
significance levels; and x2(25)=28.09, p=.30, for effect sizes), focused comparisons did
reveal differences in the study outcomes as described below.
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels broken down by levels of
the categorical predictor variables for hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the
effects of test expectancy manipulations appears in Table 3. Focused comparisons between
levels of the predictor variables based upon both significance levels and effect sizes appear
in Table 4.
Neither significance levels nor effect sizes were found to significantly vary as a
function of the dependent task required of the participants. However, significance levels
and effect sizes did vary as a function of the dependent measure which was employed by
the primary researchers (see Table 4). Specifically, as a measure of frequency judgment,
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mean frequency generated significantly smaller effect sizes than both mean correct and
mean of the medians, which did not differ significantly from each other.
Neither effect sizes nor significance levels varied as a function of the stimuli used in
the study, nor as a function of the length of the study list (see Table CI). Additionally,
they did not vary as a function of the test expectancy manipulation used in the individual
studies (see Table 4). However, it may be meaningful to look at the study outcomes as
blocked by the test expectancy manipulation. Specifically, individuals given frequency test
instructions performed slightly better on the frequency judgment tasks than individuals
given general memory instructions. Moreover, no differences were seen in those studies
that compared individuals given frequency test instructions to those given no instructions
concerning the upcoming test (incidental). Likewise, no differences were seen in those
studies that compared individuals given general memory test instructions to those given no
instructions concerning the upcoming test (incidental).
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Table

7

Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onSemanticVersusStructuralDepthofProcessing
Level of Predictor

Significance Level
Z

p

Effect Size

FSN

d

Dependent Task
Discrimination 16)

2.31

.01

19.14

0.20

Estimation(15)

2.13

.01

3.13

0.13

Mean Correct(ll)

2.29

.01

18.27

0.19

Mean Frequency(8)

.04

.48

-7.87

0.00

Correlation / Slope(6)

1.51

.06

3.26

0.24

Mean Median(l)

2.76

.02

NA

0.45

Words in Native Language(22)

2.96

.001

47.99

0.15

Pictures / Figures(3)

1.71

.04

0.57

0.43

Nonsense Syllables(l)

-0.79

.79

NA

-0.38

Frequency vs. General Memory(12)

2.56

.00

0.70

0.14

Frequency vs. Incidental 12)

1.45

.07

7.43

0.15

Incidental vs. General Memory(2)

1.10

.14

1.24

0.32

Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test Manipulation

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table

2

Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for theCognitiveAbilityMeta-Analysis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=1.28(p=09)

Z=1.09(p=. 14)

Mean Freq. vs. Mean Correct

Z=2.11 (p=.01)

Z=1,90(p=02)

Mean Freq. vs. Correlation

Z=1.61(p=.05)

Z=1.68(p=.04)

Mean Freq. vs. Mean Medians

Z=2.57(p=.00)

Z=2.67(p=.00)

Mean Medians vs. Correlation

Z=0.80(p=.21)

Z=1.77(p=.03)

Mean Medians vs. Mean Correct

Z = l . 10(p=. 14)

Z=1.86(p=.03)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=0.12(p=.45)

Z=0.05(p=.48)

Words vs. Nonsense Syllables

Z = l . 1 l(p=. 13)

Z=1.39(p=.08)

Words vs. Pictures

Z=1.18(p=.12)

Z=0.67(p=.25)

Pictures vs. Nonsense Syllables

Z=1.53(p=.06)

Z=1.58(p=.05)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test
(Frequency vs. General Memory) vs. (Frequency vs. Incidental)
Z=1.03(g=.15)

Z=.28(p=.39)

(Frequency vs. General Memory) vs. (Incidental vs. General Memory)
Z=2.05(p=.02)

Z=1.30(p=.00)

(Frequency vs. Incidental) vs. (Incidental vs. General Memory)
Z=1.48(p=.06)

Z=1.15(p=.13)

Strategy
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the four hypothesis tests which were included in the metaanalysis on the effects of strategy appear in Table B3 (see Appendix B). These studies fell
into one homogeneous cluster, as indicated by the disjoint cluster analysis. The funnel plot
of effect size as a function of sample size for these four studies revealed an absence of

38
nonsignificant effect sizes (see Figure 5), perhaps reflecting a bias against publishing
nonsignificant results. Note that all of the studies included in this analysis were published.
The overall combination of significance levels (Z s ignificance=5.20, p=.00)
indicates that processing strategies did indeed influence individuals' frequency judgment
performance. Furthermore, the combination of effect sizes (Zeffect=-42, d=.87) generated
a large effect as described by Cohen (1988). Fifty-four unpublished studies supporting the
null hypothesis would be needed to overturn the combined significance level. This meets
Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the fail-safe number (in this case, 5k +10 = 30). Therefore,
it is highly unlikely that the obtained results are the product of a sampling bias, and they
may be interpreted as reflecting true differences between individuals using different
processing strategies. A diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the
effects sizes seemed to indicate that there was no variability in either measure (x2(3)=2.91,
P=.40, for significance levels; and /2(3)=6.57, g=.08, for effect sizes).
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels as broken down by levels
of the categorical predictor variables for the hypothesis tests in the meta-analysis on the
effects of strategy manipulations appears in Table 5. Focused comparisons between levels
of the predictor variables based on both significance levels and effect sizes appear in Table
6.
The only categorical predictor that produced any variability in the effect sizes was
dependent measure. Specifically, the dependent measure correlation yielded larger group
differences than did the dependent measure mean median. The continuous predictor, study
list length, also produced variability in the effect sizes (see Table CI). Specifically, as the
study list length increased, the effectiveness of the strategy manipulations decreased.
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Table

7

Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onSemanticVersusStructuralDepthofProcessing
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

d

Discrimination 1)

2.30

.01

NA

0.89

Estimation(3)

4.72

.00

35.06

0.87

Mean Correct(l)

2.29

.01

NA

0.87

Correlation / Slope(2)

5.59

.00

21.00

1.40

Mean Median(l)

2.26

.01

NA

0.49

5.20

.00

54

0.42

Frequency(2)

4.23

.00

11.21

1.04

General Memory(l)

2.26

.01

NA

0.49

Counting Vs. None(l)

2.30

.01

NA

0.89

Free Vs. Restricted Rehearsal(l)

2.26

.01

NA

0.49

Repetition Vs. Imagery(l)

4.21

.00

NA

1.55

Semantic Vs. Counting(l)

3.68

.00

NA

1.19

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Native Language Words(4)
Expected Test

Strategy Manipulation

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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2

Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for theCognitiveAbilityMeta-Analysis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation

Z=0.38(p=.35)

Z=0.94(p=.17)

Correlation vs. Mean Median

Z=2.42(p=.00)

Z=1.37(p=.08)

Correlation vs. Mean Correct

Z=0.94(p=. 17)

Z= 1.34(2=.. 08)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Median

Z=0.87(P=. 19)

Z=0.03(P=.49)

Z=1.50(p=.06)

Z=.60(p=.28)

Dependent Measure

Expected Test
Frequency vs. General Memory
Strategy Manipulation
(Semantic vs. Counting) vs. (Counting vs. None)
Z=0.52(p=.30)

Z=0.98(p=. 16)

(Repetition vs. Imagery) vs. (Counting vs. None)
Z=1.15(p=.13)

Z=1.35(e=.08)

(Free Rehearsal vs. Restricted Rehearsal) vs. (Counting vs. None)
Z=0.87(p=.19)

Z=0.03(p=.49)

(Semantic vs. Counting) vs. (Free Rehearsal vs. Restricted Rehearsal)
Z=1.51(p=.07)

Z=1.00(p=.16)

(Repetition vs. Imagery) vs. (Free Rehearsal vs. Restricted Rehearsal)
Z=2.40(p=.00)

Z=1.38(p=.08)

(Semantic vs. Counting) vs. (Repetition vs. Imagery)
Z=0.60(g=.27)

Z=0.37(p=.35)

Levels of Processing
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the eight hypothesis tests which were included in the metaanalysis on the effects of levels of processing appear in Table B4 (see Appendix B). Those
studies which manipulated the depth of processing fell into two distinct clusters as
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determined by the disjoint cluster analysis. In addition, the disjoint cluster analysis
identified one outlier (Erickson & Gaffney, 1985) that did not fall into either of the
aforementioned clusters. Three hypothesis tests fell together into the first cluster (i.e.,
Challis, 1993, Exp. 1; Maki & Ostby, 1987, Exp. 1, discrimination data; and Maki &
Ostby, 1987, Exp. 1, estimation data). Interestingly, for all three of these studies the depth
of processing manipulation involved comparing groups of participants who encoded
stimulus words semantically against those who encoded stimulus words structurally.
Likewise, four hypothesis tests fell together into the second cluster (i.e., Ferber, 1988;
Jonides & Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, Exp. 1; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986, Exp. 2; and
Rose & Rowe, 1976, Exp. 2). With the exception of the study conducted by Ferber
(1988), the depth of processing manipulation for all of these studies involved comparing
groups of participants who encoded stimulus words semantically to those who encoded
stimulus words acoustically. Ferber's depth of processing manipulation involved
comparing performance of individuals who encoded stimulus items semantically to
individuals who encoded stimulus items structurally. With the two clusters combined, the
funnel plot of Cohen's d as a function of sample size for all of these studies did not reveal a
publication bias (see Figure 6). Further analyses were conducted upon the two
homogeneous clusters separately.
Cluster One (Semantic vs. Structural Manipulations)
Typical Effect Size and Variability. In this first cluster, the combination of
significance levels (Zsignificance=6.62, p=.00) did indicate that the depth of processing
manipulation influenced individuals' frequency judgment performance. Furthermore, the
combination of effect sizes (Zeffect=-64> d=1.88) produced a large effect as described by
Cohen (1988) which reflects better frequency judgment performance for those groups
induced to use semantic orienting tasks at the time of encoding. Thirty-nine unpublished
studies supporting the null hypothesis would be needed to overturn the combined
significance level. This meets Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the fail-safe number (in this
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case, 5k +10 = 25). Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the results obtained in this analysis
are the product of a sampling bias, and these results can be interpreted as representing true
group differences. A diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the effects
sizes indicated that there was variability in the significance levels (x2(2)=8.45, p=.00), but
not in the effect sizes (x2(2)=1.75, p=.42).
Analysis of Coded Predictors. For the first cluster of studies, the combination of
effect sizes and of significance levels as broken down by levels of the categorical predictor
variables appears in Table 7. Focused comparisons between levels of the predictor
variables appear based on both significance levels and effect sizes appear in Table 8.
Neither significance levels nor effect sizes significantly varied as a function of the
dependent task required of the participants. However, significance levels, but not effect
sizes, varied as a function of the type of dependent measure employed by the researchers.
Specifically, the significance levels of the mean frequency measures differed significantly
from those obtained with either the mean correct measure or the correlational measure,
which did not differ from each other.
Additionally, variability in the effect sizes was a function of the study list length.
Specifically, as the length of the study list increased, differences between individuals using
different processing tasks decreased (see Table CI, Appendix C).
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Table 7
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis on Semantic Versus Structural Depth of Processing
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size
d

Z

p

FSN

Discrimination 1)

2.07

.01

NA

1.17

Estimation(2)

6.32

.00

24.94

2.03

Mean Correct( 1)

2.07

.02

NA

1.17

Mean Frequency(l)

5.89

.00

NA

2.14

Correlation / Slope(l)

2.65

.00

NA

1.58

6.62

.00

39

1.88

General Memory(2)

3.34

.00

6.25

1.37

Incidental 1)

5.89

.00

NA

2.14

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Native Language Words(3)
Expected Test

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table 8
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for the Meta-Analysis on Semantic Versus Structural Depth of
Processing
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=0.85(p=.20)

Z=1.80(p=.03)

Mean Frequency vs. Mean Correct

Z=1.23(p=. 11)

Z=2.70(p=.00)

Mean Frequency vs. Correlation

Z=0.68(p=.25)

Z=2.29(p=.01)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=0.43(p=.33)

Z=0.41(p=.34)

Z=1.25(p=.10)

Z=2.87(p=.00

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

Expected Test
General Memory vs. Incidental

Cluster Two
Typical Effect Size and Variability. In the second cluster, the combination of
significance levels (Z s ignificance=2.61, p=.00) indicated that the depth of processing
manipulation influenced individuals frequency judgment performance. However, the
combination of effect sizes (Z e ffect=-14, d=.28) produced only a small effect as described
by Cohen (1988), reflecting slightly better frequency judgment performance for those
groups induced to use an acoustic or semantic orienting task at the time of encoding as
opposed to a structural orienting task. Since only five unpublished studies supporting the
null hypothesis would be needed to overturn the combined significance level, the results of
the current analysis do not meet Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the fail-safe number (in this
case, 5k +10 = 30). It is possible, therefore, that the obtained results are the product of a
publication bias. Hence, interpretations should not be based upon this overall analysis.
Additionally, a diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the effects sizes
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indicated that there was no variability in either the significance levels (x2(3)=5.15, £>=.16),
or the effect sizes (x2(3)=4.73, p=. 19).
Analysis of Coded Predictors. For the second cluster of studies, the combination
of effect sizes and of significance levels as broken down by levels of the categorical
predictor variables appears in Table 9. Focused comparisons between levels of the
predictor variables based on both significance levels and effect sizes appear in Table 10.
Focused comparisons between levels of the categorical predictors paralleled the
results the diffuse comparisons. Neither effect sizes nor significance levels varied as a
function of the dependent measure employed, as a function of the depth of processing
comparison made, or as a function of the test expectancy of the participants. However,
both effects sizes and significance levels varied as a function of study list length (see Table
CI). Specifically, as the length of the study list increased, the benefits of acoustic and
semantic processing strategies decreased.
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Table 9
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Second Cluster of the Meta-Analysis on Levels of Processing
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

d

Mean Frequency*; 1)

0.30

.38

NA

0.05

Correlation / Slope(3)

2.93

.00

4.62

0.38

Frequency(l)

1.97

.02

NA

0.52

Incidental^)

0.21

.42

-1.98

0.02

Semantic Vs. Acoustic(3)

2.81

.00

5.94

0.35

Semantic Vs. Structural(l)

-0.08

.53

NA

-0.01

Dependent Task
No Variability
Dependent Measure

Stimuli
No Variability
Expected Test

Levels of Processing

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table 10
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for the Second Cluster of the Levels of Processing Meta-Analysis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=1.14(p=.12)

Z=1.05(p=.15)

Z= 1.6l(p=.05)

Z= 1.52(p=.06)

Dependent Measure
Mean Frequency vs. Correlation
Expected Test
Frequency vs. Incidental
Levels of Processing
(Semantic vs. Acoustic) vs. (Semantic vs. Structural)
Z=1.28(p=.10)

Z=1.49(p=.06)

Age - Elderly
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the 28 hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the
effects of age for elderly adults appear in Table B5 (see Appendix B). The disjoint cluster
analysis identified one outlier (Wiggs, Martin, & Howard, 1994, Exp. 1). The remaining
27 hypothesis tests fell into one homogeneous cluster. Furthermore, the funnel plot of
Cohen's d as a function of sample size for these studies does not reveal a publication bias
(see Figure 7).
Overall, the combination of significance levels (Zsig n ificance=7.20, p=.00)
indicated that the age of individuals influenced frequency judgment performance. The
combination of effect sizes (Z e ffect=-16, d=.31) produced a small effect as described by
Cohen (1988), which reflects superior frequency judgment performance of the younger
adults. Three hundred sixty studies yielding nonsignificant results would be needed to
overturn the combined significance levels of the included studies. This meets Rosenthal's
(1984) criteria for the fail-safe number (in this case 5k+10=145). It is highly unlikely,
therefore, that the obtained results are the product of a sampling bias. Hence, the results
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can be interpreted as reflecting true group differences in frequency judgment performance.
A diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and the effects sizes indicated that
there was variability in both measures ( x 2 ( 2 6 ) = 5 1 . 7 8 , p = . 0 0 , for significance levels; and
X2(26)=43.30,

p=.01, for effect sizes).

It is important to note that in this particular meta-analysis many of the effects of age
were contained within the age by presentation frequency interaction. Of the seven studies
that used mean frequency as a measure, six found an age by presentation frequency
interaction. Unfortunately, in the current meta-analysis, this information could not be
used, since the means and standard deviations for both the young and elderly groups at
each frequency level were not available for all of the studies. As a result, it is likely that the
combined effect size for the studies using mean frequency as a measure is underestimated.
Likewise, it is likely that the combined effect size for the studies using estimation as the
dependent task is under estimated.
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels as broken down by levels
of the categorical predictor variables for the meta-anslysis on the effects of old age appears
in Table 11. Focused comparisons between levels of the predictor variables based on both
significance levels and on effect sizes appear in Table 12.
Both effect sizes and significance levels varied as a function of the dependent task
which the participants were required to perform. More specifically, larger differences
between younger and older adults were seen for studies which employed a discrimination
task than for those which employed an estimation task. Furthermore, both effect sizes and
significance levels varied as a function of the type of dependent measure employed by the
individual researchers. Significantly larger differences between younger and older adults
were observed in the use of the mean correct measure than the use of the mean frequency
measure. Note that in this case, the mean correct measure is completely contained within
the discrimination task.
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While neither effect sizes nor significance levels varied as a function of the type of
stimuli used for the study, both effect sizes and significance levels did vary as a function of
the type of test which participants expected. Specifically, larger advantages in the
frequency judgment performance of young adults were seen for studies in which
participants were given a general memory test expectancy than for those studies in which
participants were given no test expectancy (incidental). Additionally, observations on the
differences between the frequency judgments of young and elderly adults within each test
expectancy condition revealed that: (a) given general memory test expectations and given
frequency test expectations young adults show superior frequency judgment performance
as compared to elderly adults and (b) given incidental or no test expectations there is no
difference between the frequency judgment performance of young and elderly adults.
Lastly, neither effect sizes nor significance levels varied as a function of the length
of the study list employed in the study (see Table CI, Appendix C). However, since
previous analyses indicated that the influence of study list length may vary depending upon
the test expectancy of the participants, the influence of study list length was examined
under each type of test expectancy. Results indicated that there was a marginally significant
effect (p=.03) of study list length in frequency test expectancy conditions. In particular,
when individuals expected the upcoming frequency test, the differences between younger
and older adults' performance on the frequency judgment test decreased as study list length
increased.
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Table 11
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis on Age-Elderly
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

g

FSN

d

Discrimination 13)

6.72

.00

179.57

0.44

Estimation( 14)

3.49

.00

19.42

0.19

Mean Correct(13)

6.72

.00

179.57

0.44

Mean Frequency(7)

0.73

.23

-5.07

0.07

Correlation/Slope(7)

3.92

.00

12.30

0.29

Native Language Words(22)

6.16

.00

195.35

0.29

Nonsense Syllables(2)

3.02

.01

4.86

0.58

Pictures / Figures(3)

2.94

.001

2.27

0.32

Frequency(5)

2.30

.01

-0.80

0.18

General Memory( 12)

5.27

.00

88.73

0.34

Incidental(2)

-0.46

.68

-1.70

-0.10

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table 12
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for the Age-Elderly Meta-Analvsis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=2.78(p=.00)

Z=2.80(p=.00)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=1.79(p=.03)

Z=1.54(B=.06)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Frequency

Z=2.45(p=.00)

Z=3.05(e=.00)

Mean Frequency vs. Correlation

Z=0.71(e=.24)

Z=1.32(e=.09)

Native Words vs. Ideograms

Z=1.44(p=.07)

Z=1.42(p=.07)

Native Words vs. Pictures

Z=0.08(p=.46)

Z=0.25(p=.40)

Pictures vs. Ideograms

Z=1.32(E=.09)

Z=0.98(e=.16)

Frequency vs. General Memory

Z=1.33(ef.09)

Z=1.31(e=.09)

Frequency vs. Incidental

Z=l.ll(e=.13)

Z=.134(p=.08)

General Memory vs. Incidental

Z=2.14(p=.01)

Z=2.39(p=.00)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test

Age - Children
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the eleven hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the
effects of age for children appear in Table B6 (see Appendix B). The disjoint cluster
analysis identified one outlier (Goldstein, Hasher, & Stein, 1983, Exp. 1), with the
remaining 10 hypothesis tests falling into one homogeneous cluster. The funnel plot of
effect size as a function of sample size for these studies reveals an absence of negative
effect sizes (see Figure 8). It does not, however, reflect a bias for the publication of
significant results.
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Overall, there was no effect of a child's age on the child's frequency judgment, as
indicated by the combination of significance levels (Z s ignificance=l-53, £=.06). The
combination of effect sizes (Zeffect=-10, d=.19) yielded a small effect as described by
Cohen (1988). Additionally, only eleven studies with significant results (at £=.05) would
need to be added to this analysis in order to bring the combined significance levels of these
studies to £=.05. Therefore, it is possible that this lack of effect is the product of a
sampling bias (fail-safe number is 65). A diffuse comparison of both the significance
levels and of the effects sizes indicated that there was no variability in either the significance
levels (x2(9) =9.37, £=.40), or the effect sizes (x2(9)=l 1.17, £=.26).
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels as broken down by levels
of the categorical predictor variables for the meta-anlysis on the effects of age for children
appears in Table 13. Focused comparisons between levels of the categorical predictor
variables based on both significance levels and on effect sizes appear in Table 14.
In this particular meta-analysis it was important to discover if effect sizes varied as a
function of the type of developmental comparison made by the individual researchers.
While some studies compared the frequency judgments of children to those of young adults
(i.e., college students), other studies compared the frequency judgments of younger and
older children. Marginally significant effects (£=.03) were observed for the type of
developmental comparison made by the primary researchers. However, contrary to
intuition, larger effect sizes were generated in those studies which compared children to
other children (approximately kindergarten age to third grade age) than in those studies
which compared children (approximately fifth grade age) to young adults (college
students). Reasons for this counterintuitive finding will be discussed later.
Overall, neither the effect sizes nor the significance levels varied as a function of the
type of stimuli used in the respective studies. All studies either used words or pictures as
stimuli. However, since the participants in the studies were children, it was thought that

53
effect sizes might vary as a function of the type of stimuli employed depending upon the
developmental comparison made by the researchers. This was indeed the case.
Specifically, when comparing children with college students, it did not matter what type of
stimuli were used (Z=.00, p=.50 for both comparisons based on significance levels and on
effect sizes). Studies comparing children with college students produced equivalent effect
sizes for both words and pictures (d=.02). However, when comparing children with other
children, the difference between the two groups approached significance (Z=1.98, p=.02
for effect sizes). Specifically, there were larger group differences in studies that used
words as stimuli (d=1.26) than in studies using pictures as stimuli (d=.24). While both
effect sizes reflect the tendency for older children to perform better than younger children
on the frequency judgment tasks, these differences are exaggerated when words are used as
stimuli as opposed to when pictures are used as stimuli.
Additionally, it was found that variation in the effect sizes and the significance
levels due to the test expectancy of the individuals approached statistical significance.
Specifically, frequency test instructions produced larger group differences than did general
memory instructions. None of these studies used incidental memory instructions. Since
the variation in effect sizes for other predictors appears to depend upon the type of
developmental comparison which is being made, the effects of test expectancy as a function
of the type of developmental comparison made were also examined . When comparing
children with college students, it did not matter which type of test expectancy was used
(Z=.06, g=.47 for significance levels; and Z=.07, £=.47 for effect sizes). However, when
comparing children with other children, variation in group differences due to differing test
expectancyapproached significance. Specifically, larger effect sizes were observed in those
studies using frequency test instructions (d=.59) than in those studies using general
memory instructions (d=0) (Z=1.99, £=.02).
Lastly, overall, the correlation between study list length and effect size was
nonsignificant (see Table CI). Furthermore, the effects of the study list length did not vary
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as a function of developmental comparison, nor as a function of test expectancy conditions,
a marginally significant result was observed.
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Table 17
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onEncodingVariability
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

2

FSN

d

Discrimination^)

2.70

.00

7.59

0.58

Estimation(7)

0.30

.38

-5.37

0.06

Mean Correct(3)

2.70

.00

7.59

0.58

Mean Frequency(2)

0.00

.50

-2.00

0.00

Correlation/Slope(2)

0.21

.42

-1.96

0.04

Mean Median(3)

0.26

.40

-1.82

0.14

Native Language Words(4)

0.57

.29

1.53

0.21

Pictures / Figures(6)

1.55

.06

-1.25

0.19

Frequency(6)

2.52

.00

13.92

0.44

General Memory(3)

0.08

.47

-2.99

0.01

Child vs. Child(7)

2.25

.01

11.85

0.36

Child vs. College Student(3)

0.15

.44

-2.96

0.02

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test

Developmental Comparison

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number.
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Table 18
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for theEncodingVariabilityMeta-Analvsis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=1.70(p=.04)

Z=2.15(g=.01)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=2.03(p=.02)

Z=1.78(p=.03)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Frequency

Z=2.04(p= 02)

Z=1.95(g=.02)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Medians

Z=0.75(g=.23)

Z=1.45(p=07)

Mean Frequency vs. Correlation

Z=0.14(p=.44)

Z=0.16(g=.44)

Mean Frequency vs. Mean Medians

Z=1.02(p=. 15)

Z=0.65(g=.26)

Correlation vs. Mean Medians

Z=0.95(p=. 17)

Z=0.48(g=.31)

Native Words vs. Pictures

Z=1.49(p=.06)

Z=0.57(p=.28)

Z=2.03(p=.02)

Z=1.68(p=.04)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Expected Test
Frequency vs. General Memory
Developmental Comparison
(Child vs. Child) vs. (Child vs. College Student)
Z=1.89(g=.03)

Z=1.34(p=.09)
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Capacity
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the ten hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the
effects of limitations on processing capacity at the time of encoding appear in Table B7 (see
Appendix B). The disjoint cluster analysis indicated that all ten of the hypothesis tests fell
into one homogeneous cluster. Furthermore, the funnel plot of effect size as a function of
sample size for these studies did not reveal a publication bias (see Figure 9).
The combination of significance levels (Z s ignificance=6.57, g=.00) indicated that
overall there was an effect of the manipulations of processing capacity on frequency
judgment performance. The combination of effect sizes (Z e ffect=-32, d=.65) produced a
medium effect as described by Cohen (1988) and reflects superior performance of those
individuals who were not distracted during the encoding episode as opposed to those
individuals who were distracted during the encoding episode. One hundred sixty-one
studies yielding nonsignificant results would be needed to overturn the combined
significance levels of the included studies. This meets Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the
fail-safe number (in this case 5k +10 = 60). Hence, it is highly unlikely that the obtained
results are the product of a sampling bias. Therefore, the results may be interpreted as
reflecting true differences in the frequency judgment performance of individuals given
differing processing capacity limitations. However, a diffuse comparison of both the
significance levels and of the effects sizes indicated that there was variability in both
(X2(9)=23.10, £=.00 for significance levels; and x2(9)=24.80, £=.00 for effect sizes).
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels as broken down by levels
of the categorical predictor variables for the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis
on the effects of encoding capacity limitations appears in Table 15. Focused comparisons

58
between levels of the categorical predictor variables based on both significance levels and
on effect sizes appear in Table 16.
Despite the significant results in the diffuse comparisons of significance levels and
effect sizes, neither varied as a function of the dependent task which the participants were
required to perform, the type of dependent measure employed by the researchers, the type
of stimuli used in the study, or the type of instructions which participants received. While
significance levels did vary as a function of the type of capacity-limiting manipulation
(ancillary task), effect sizes did not. Moreover, neither effect sizes nor significance levels
significantly varied as a function of study list length.
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Table 17
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onEncodingVariability
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

Discrimination^)

4.00

.00

17.87

0.65

Estimation(7)

5.25

.00

64.93

0.64

Mean Correct(3)

4.00

.00

17.87

0.65

Mean Frequency(3)

3.08

.00

4.64

0.57

Correlation/Slope(4)

4.36

.00

38.67

0.69

Native Language Words(8)

6.18

.00

114.10

0.62

Pictures / Figures(2)

2.80

.00

1.99

0.44

General Memory(6)

4.20

.00

27.80

0.56

Incidental (3)

2.89

.00

11.92

0.61

Alcohol Intoxication(2)

3.77

.00

8.49

0.82

Depression(l)

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Arithmetic Task(4)

3.59

.00

22.47

0.58

Tone Monitoring(2)

1.45

.07

2.40

0.46

Case Monitoring(l)

4.22

.00

NA

0.95

d

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test

Ancillary Task

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table 18
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for theEncodingVariabilityMeta-Analvsis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=0.56(j>=.29)

Z=0.74(p=.23)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=0.13(E=.45)

Z=0.20(|)=.41)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Frequency

Z=1.15(p=.12)

Z=1.21(p=.ll)

Mean Frequency vs. Correlation

Z=1.28(p=.10)

Z=1.09(p=.14)

Native Words vs. Pictures

Z=0.05(j)=.48)

Z=0.79(p=.21)

Z=0.68(g=.25)

Z=0.43(p=.33)

Intoxication vs. Depressed

Z=1.35(j>=.08)

Z=2.17(g=.01)

Intoxication vs. Arithmetic Task

Z=0.26(p=.40)

Z=0.63(p=.36)

Intoxication vs. Tone Monitoring

Z=0.24(p=.41)

Z=0.94(E=.17)

Intoxication vs. Case Monitoring

Z=0.40(p=.34)

Z= 1.27(2=. 10)

Depression vs. Arithmetic Task

Z=.1.26(p=.10)

Z=1.89(j)=.02)

Depression vs. Tone Monitoring

Z=1.19(p=.12)

Z=1.41(p=.08)

Depression vs. Case Monitoring

Z=1.55(e>=.06)

Z=2.99(e=.00)

Arithmetic vs. Tone Monitoring

Z=0.02(p=.49)

Z=0.45(p=.34)

Arithmetic vs. Case Monitoring

Z=0.71(p=.24)

Z = 1.89(2=. 02)

Tone vs. Case Monitoring

Z=0.61(p=.27)

Z=2.04(p=.02)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Expected Test
General Memory vs. Incidental
Ancillary Task
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Encoding Variability
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the twelve hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the
effects of encoding variability appear in Table B8 (see Appendix B). The disjoint cluster
analysis indicated that all twelve of the hypothesis tests fell into one homogeneous cluster.
Furthermore, the funnel plot of effect size as a function of sample size for these studies did
not reveal a publication bias (see Figure 10).
Overall, there was no effect of encoding variability on participants' frequency
judgments (for combination of significance levels Z s ignificance=-37, g=.35 and for
combination of effect sizes Zeffect=-00, d=.0). Nine studies yielding significant results of
at least p=.05 would be needed to overturn the nonsignificant effect of encoding variability.
Therefore, it is possible that the lack of effect is the result of a sampling bias (fail-safe
number is 70). A diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the effects sizes
indicated that there was significant variability in both (x2(l 1)=57.56, g=.00, for
significance levels and /2(11)=56.24, g=.00, for effect sizes).
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and significance levels broken down by levels of
the categorical predictor variables for the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on
encoding variability appears in Table 17. Focused comparisons between levels of the
categorical predictor variables based on both significance levels and on effect sizes appear
in Table 18.
There was no variability in either the type of dependent measure required of the
participants or of the type of stimuli presented to the participants. All studies used an
estimation task and all studies used words as stimuli. Neither effect sizes nor significance
levels varied as a function of the type of dependent measure or by the length of the study
list (see Table CI, Appendix C).
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However, effect sizes and significance levels did vary significantly as a function of
the type of test which participants expected. In particular, in those studies using frequency
test instructions, participants' frequency judgments benefited from increased encoding
variability, whereas, in those studies using either general memory instructions or incidental
instructions participants' frequency judgments deteriorated as a function of encoding
variability.
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Table 17
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis on Encoding Variability
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

d

0.37

.35

9

0.00

Mean Frequency(4)

-0.38

.65

-3.61

-0.03

Correlation/Slope(8)

0.74

.23

-6.69

0.00

0.37

.35

9

0.00

Frequency( 1)

2.08

.01

NA

0.66

General Memory(7)

0.29

.39

.76

-0.05

Incidental(3)

-1.45

.93

-.40

-0.20

Dependent Task
Estimation(12)
Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Native Language Words(12)
Expected Test

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.

64
Table 18
Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for the Encoding Variability Meta-Analvsis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=0.26(p=.40)

Z=3.44(£=.49)

Frequency vs. General Memory

Z=2.64(g=.00)

Z=2.56(p=.00)

Frequency vs. Incidental

Z=2.56(p=.00)

Z=2.57(p=.00)

General Memory vs. Incidental

Z=0.03(p=.48)

Z=0.33(g=.37)

Dependent Measure
Mean Frequency vs. Correlation
Instructions

Practice
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the five hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the
effects of practice appear in Table B9 (see Appendix B). The disjoint cluster analysis
identified one outlier (Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982, Exp. 1), which was removed from
further analyses. The remaining four hypothesis tests fell into one homogeneous cluster.
Additionally, funnel plot of effect size as a function of sample size for these studies did not
reveal a publication bias (see Figure 11).
Overall, there was no effect of practice on participants' frequency judgments (for
combination of significance levels, Zsignificance=-53, j>=.30, and for combination of
effect sizes, Zeffect=-05, d=.ll). Three studies yielding significant results of at least
g=.05 would be needed to overturn the nonsignificant effect of encoding variability.
Therefore, it is possible that the lack of effect is the result of a sampling bias (fail-safe
number is 30). Additionally, a diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of
the effects sizes indicated that there was no variability in either one (x2(3)=2.27, £=.52,
for significance levels and x2(3)=2.47, £=.48, for effect sizes).
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Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels broken down by levels of
the categorical predictor variables appears in Table 19. Comparisons of the combined
effect sizes and significance levels between levels of the predictor variables appear in Table
20. Consistent with the overall diffuse comparison of both significance levels and effect
sizes, neither significance levels nor effect sizes were found to vary as a function of any of
the categorical predictor variables. Additionally, neither effect sizes nor significance levels
varied as a function of the study list length (see Table CI, Appendix C).
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Table 17
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onEncodingVariability
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

d

Discrimination( 1)

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Estimation(3)

0.54

2.9

-1.87

0.13

Mean Correct(2)

0.00

.50

-2.00

0.00

Correlation/Slope( 1)

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Mean Medians(l)

1.74

.04

NA

0.58

0.53

.30

3

0.11

0.53

.30

3

0.11

Multiple Lists - Same Test Session

0.53

.30

-1.87

0.12

Multiple Lists - Across Test Sessions

0.00

.50

NA

0.00

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli
Native Language Words(4)
Expectcd Test
Frequency(4)
Practice Manipulation

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table

18

Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for theEncodingVariabilityMeta-Analvsis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=0.45(p=34)

Z=0.50(e=.31)

Mean Correct vs. Correlation

Z=0.00(£=.50)

Z=0.00(p=.50)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Medians

Z=1.28(p=. 10)

Z=1.42(p=.07)

Mean Medians vs. Correlation

Z= 1.52(2=.06)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure

z

= 1.23(g=.l0)

Practice Manipulation
Same Test Session vs Across Testing Sessions
Z=0.37(P=.36)

Z=0.50(E=.31)

Internal Generation
Typical Effect Size and Variability
Characteristics of the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on the effects
of internal generation appear in Table B10 (see Appendix B). There were only three
hypothesis tests in the meta-analysis on internal generation. These three tests fell into one
homogeneous cluster as indicated by the disjoint cluster analysis. The funnel plot of effect
size as a function of sample size can be seen in Figure 12. Because of the small number of
studies included in this analysis, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a publication
bias from the funnel plot.
Overall, the combination of significance levels (Zsignificance=5.56, g=.00)
indicated that there was a significant effect of internal generation on participants' frequency
judgments. While the combination of effect sizes (Zeffect=-57, d=1.2) produced a small
effect as described by Cohen (1988), it does reflect the tendency for the internal generation
of stimuli to inflate frequency judgments. Thirty studies yielding nonsignificant results
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would be needed to overturn this combined significance. This meets Rosenthal's (1984)
criteria (in this case, 5k + 10 = 25) for the fail-safe number. Therefore, it is highly unlikely
that the obtained results are the product of a sampling bias. These results may, therefore,
be interpreted as reflecting true differences due to internal generation of stimulus materials.
Moreover, a diffuse comparison of both the significance levels and of the effects sizes
indicated that there was no variability in either one (x2(2)=4.13, p=. 13, for significance
levels and x2(3)=2.32, p=.31, for effect sizes).
Analysis of Coded Predictors
The combination of effect sizes and of significance levels broken down by levels of
the categorical predictor variables for the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis on
the effects of internal generation appears in Table 21. Focused comparisons between levels
of the categorical predictor variables based on both significance levels and on effect sizes
appear in Table 22. Consistent with the overall diffuse comparison of both significance
levels and effect sizes, neither significance levels nor effect sizes were found to vary as a
function of any of the categorical predictor variables. Moreover, neither effect sizes nor
significance levels varied as a function of the study list length (see Table CI, Appendix C).
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Table 17
Combined Effect Sizes and Significance Levels Within Each Level of the Categorical
Predictors for the Meta-Analysis onEncodingVariability
Level of Predictor

Significance Level

Effect Size

Z

p

FSN

d

Discrimination 1)

2.22

.01

NA

0.75

Estimation^)

5.30

.00

17.66

1.46

Mean Correct(l)

2.22

.01

NA

.75

Mean Frequency(2)

5.30

.00

17.66

1.46

Native Language Words(2)

5.24

.00

16.31

1.15

Pictures/Figures(l)

2.47

.00

NA

1.51

5.56

.00

30

1.20

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Stimuli

Expected Test
General Memory(3)

Note. Number in parentheses indicates the number of effect sizes included in the
combination. FSN denotes the fail-safe number. NA denotes that only one hypothesis test
was included at that particular level and therefore calculation of the fail-safe number was
not possible.
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Table

18

Focused Comparisons of Significance Levels and Effect Sizes Between Levels of the
Categorical Predictors for theEncodingVariabilityMeta-Analvsis
Comparison

Effect Size

Significance Level

Z=1.41(p=07)

Z= 1.17(2=. 12)

Mean Correct vs. Mean Frequency

Z=1.41(p=07)

Z = l . 17(p=. 12)

Native Words vs. Pictures

Z=0.61(p=.27)

Z=0.86(g=.20)

Dependent Task
Discrimination vs. Estimation
Dependent Measure
Stimuli

CHAPTER 5
Discussion
Cognitive Ability
According to Hasher and Zacks' (1979, 1984) criteria, the encoding of frequency
information, as an automatic process, should not vary as a function of individual
differences in intelligence. Hasher and Zacks made this claim based on past literature
which has shown that cognitive deficits in individuals with a lower IQ results from failures
in controlled processes (e.g., limited processing capacity, little knowledge of strategies,
and ineffective use of strategies) and not from failures in automatic processes (WoodleyZanthos & Ellis, 1989). Research investigating the frequency judgment performance of
cognitively disabled individuals has led to mixed results, with some studies concluding that
cognitive ability does influence frequency judgment (eg., Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves, 1988),
and other studies concluding that it does not (eg., Ellis & Allison, 1988).
While the present meta-analysis on the effects of cognitive ability reveals significant
declines in frequency judgment performance of lower cognitive ability groups, the fail-safe
number does not meet the criteria established by Rosenthal (1984). Thus, the overall effect
of cognitive ability on frequency judgment must be interpreted with caution. However, the
effect sizes and significance levels for the hypothesis tests included in the meta-analysis
were quite variable, suggesting that other sources of variability may be identified.
It is readily apparent from Table 1 that there is little overlap in the type of population
which the primary researchers used as their cognitively disabled group, and very different
patterns of frequency judgment performance emerge depending upon the type of cognitive
disability. Specifically, individuals with closed head injuries, Parkinson's disease, frontal
lobectomy, and detoxified alcoholic individuals performed no differently than groups of
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normal controls on the frequency judgment tasks. On the other hand, aphasics and those
classified as mentally retarded performed more poorly than normal control groups. Even
here, however, there are different patterns of results. Specifically, the difference between
normals and those classified as mentally retarded is small, while the difference between
normals and aphasics is quite large .
The finding that those classified as mentally retarded are at a disadvantage on
frequency judgment tasks may be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is that
individuals with cognitive disabilities perform poorly on tasks requiring automatic
processing as well as on tasks requiring controlled processing and, therefore, show a
deficit in performance on the frequency judgment task. The second interpretation is that the
frequency judgment task requires controlled processes. From this viewpoint, cognitively
disabled individuals perform more poorly than normal controls because they fail to use
controlled processes effectively (eg., mnemonic strategies) in the encoding of the frequency
information, while normal controls use these processes during encoding, thereby
enhancing their performance on the frequency judgment task.
While the difference in the performance on frequency judgment tasks between those
classified as mentally retarded and normal controls can be explained in terms of controlled
versus automatic processing, the large difference between aphasic patients and normal
controls may be better explained another way. An aphasia is a deficit in either
comprehending or articulating words (Kolb & Whishaw, 1995). Evidence suggests that
such deficits may be mediating the frequency judgment performance of aphasic individuals
(Wiegersma, Post, Veldhuijsen, & de Vries, 1988). Wiegersma and his colleagues (1988,
Exp. 1) used visually presented words, acoustically presented words, pictures of objects,
and abstract figures as stimuli. The aphasic patients, who had intermediate comprehension
compared with other aphasics, were at a distinct disadvantage in the judgment of the
frequency of acoustically presented words. They performed most like normals on the
judgment of abstract figures, and exhibited their best performance for pictures of objects.

73
In all likelihood, then, the large effect size in those studies using aphasic patients is
primarily due to deficits in word comprehension.
While there are significant differences between those groups that performed
frequency estimation tasks, and those groups that performed frequency discrimination
tasks, this difference is confounded with differences in the cognitive ability manipulations.
Specifically, the only studies to use a discrimination task were those studies which also
used aphasic patients as participants. Therefore, the difference between the frequency
discrimination task and the frequency estimation task is not interpretable. Likewise, the
finding that the use of the dependent measure mean correct produces significantly larger
effect sizes than the measures of mean frequency and correlation, is almost completely
carried by the discrimination studies. Therefore, it suffers the same problem of
interpretation. Further research which administers both estimation tasks with multiple
derived measures of performance and discrimination tasks to individuals with the same
cognitive deficit would be necessary to draw conclusions as to how the two types of tasks
and the types of measures differ for the cognitively disabled individual.
Finally, it must be noted that research investigating effects of individual differences
in cognitive ability on frequency judgment has taken the form of comparing the average
performance of a group of individuals with a cognitive disability to the average
performance of a group of normal individuals. Using groups means to investigate
differences between normal controls and brain damaged individuals is acceptable, but using
group means to investigate individual differences is illogical. Additionally, Hasher and
Zacks (1979, p. 372) suggested that individuals with brain damage not be included in
investigations of the effects of individual differences in intelligence on frequency judgment.
Traditional research on individual differences typically either involves obtaining the
correlation between certain individual difference measures and performance on some task,
or it involves regressing the task performance of the individual onto his or her individual
difference scores. Thus, obtaining the correlation between an individual's score on an
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intelligence test and his or her performance on a frequency task would perhaps be a more
productive way to test Hasher and Zacks' criteria of the invariance of frequency encoding
to individual differences in intelligence.
Expected Test
One of the most important aspects of an automatic process is that it operates
optimally under most circumstances (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984). Hence, controlled
processing for a task that occurs automatically should not enhance performance on that
task. Specifically, according to the automatic view of frequency information encoding the
information will be the same whether an individual expects on upcoming frequency test
(and, thereby, does use controlled processes in the encoding of frequency information) or
the individual does not expect an upcoming frequency (and, thereby, does not use
controlled processes). Research concerning whether the intention to encode frequency
information influences frequency judgment has offered mixed results (eg., Greene, 1984;
Kausler & Puckett, 1980).
The results of the overall meta-analysis suggests some reasons for these
discrepancies. The effects of varying individuals test expectancy, though significant, is
small and not stable enough to meet Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the fail-safe number.
However, this small combined effect size may be the result of variability in the study
outcomes.
Those studies comparing the frequency judgment performance of individuals
receiving general memory instructions to individuals receiving frequency test instructions
found an advantage for the frequency test instructions. Likewise, those studies that
compared the frequency judgment performance of those individuals receiving frequency
test instructions to those receiving incidental instructions displayed a marginally significant
advantage, once again, for the frequency test instructions. However, those studies that
compared the performance of individuals receiving incidental instructions to those receiving
general memory instructions did not find an advantage for either instructional set. Thus, it
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appears that under frequency test instructions participants are adopting strategies which
benefit their frequency test performance. However, those under general memory
instructions or under incidental instructions are either not adopting processing strategies or
they are adopting less effective processing strategies. While it is thought that individuals
with different expectations about the upcoming test use different strategies during the
encoding task (Greene, 1986), the studies reviewed in this particular meta-analysis did not
directly manipulate those strategies. It is therefore impossible to tell exactly what strategies
the individuals actually adopted. Studies which actually manipulate the type of strategy
which individuals use at the time of encoding might be expected to yield clearer results.
In addition to differences in effect sizes based upon the type of instructional
manipulation made, there were differences in effect sizes based upon the type of dependent
measure employed by the researchers. As a measure of frequency judgment, mean
frequency detected fewer differences between groups given different instructions that did
mean correct and mean of the median frequency judgments. The possibility that effect sizes
for mean frequency may be attenuated because the effects reside within a presentation
frequency by test expectancy interaction can be discarded, however, since none of the
included studies yielded a significant presentation frequency by test expectancy interaction.
These results suggest that mean frequency is not as accurate as other measures, such as
mean correct and mean of the median frequency judgments, in detecting individuals'
sensitivity to the frequency of occurrence of events.
Strategy
In an attempt to eliminate the problems associated with merely manipulating
individuals' expectancy about the upcoming test, many researchers have induced
individuals to use different strategies at the time of encoding (eg., Greene, 1986, Exp. 3;
Proctor & Ambler, 1975, Exp. 2). The focus of the current meta-analysis is on
manipulations of processing strategies other than manipulations of depth of processing
which are discussed separately in a later section. In the studies included in the current
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meta-analysis participants were induced to use different strategies such as imagery or
counting to encode frequency information. In the literature on the use of such strategies,
there is agreement that counting , semantic elaboration, and imagery during the encoding
episode does benefit the encoding of frequency of occurrence information (e.g., Greene,
1986, Exp. 3; Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982).
In line with this research, the current meta-analysis indicated that manipulating the
strategy which participants used at the time of encoding greatly influenced their subsequent
frequency judgments. Furthermore, the effect of strategy manipulations was large and
stable. The larger difference in effect sizes for the current meta-analysis as opposed to the
meta-analysis on the effects of test expectancy is to be expected if studies in the current
meta-analysis have stronger control over the strategies which participants are actually using
to encode frequency information. Little knowledge as to what may be the best strategy for
the encoding of frequency information may be gained from this analysis though, since each
of the studies included compared the use of different strategies. Interestingly, these
strategy comparisons did not produce differing effect sizes — that is, all of the
manipulations of strategy produced approximately equivalent group differences. In general
these studies showed that (a) counting yields better frequency judgment performance than
no specified strategy , (b) free rehearsal yields better frequency judgment performance than
does restricted rehearsal, (c) imagery yields better frequency judgment performance than
does repetition , and (d) semantic elaboration yields better frequency judgment performance
than does counting.
It is of interest that as the length of the study list increased, the effect of strategy
manipulations decreased, suggesting that as memory becomes maximally taxed the benefits
of performing controlled processing strategies such as semantic elaboration and counting
are attenuated. This interpretation must be taken with caution, however, since in the
current meta-analysis study list length is confounded with the type of processing strategy
comparison (i.e., each processing strategy comparison used a different study list length).
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Further research, either manipulating study list length within one strategy manipulation or
across several strategy manipulations must be conducted before this explanation could be
wholly embraced.
As was observed in the meta-analysis on the effects of test expectancy, some
variability in the effect sizes is due to the type of dependent measure employed by the
primary researchers. Specifically, the mean of the median frequency judgments differed
significantly from correlation. It appears that correlations may be more sensitive to
differences in frequency judgment than mean of the median frequency judgments.
Levels of Processing
An additional means of manipulating the encoding strategies is to vary the depth at
which individuals process stimulus words. Past research has shown a superiority in
memory for stimuli that have been encoded at deeper levels (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik
& Tulving, 1975). For example, words processed semantically show superior
memorability to words either processed acoustically or structurally. Tasks manipulating
depth of processing usually involve the administration of different orienting instructions.
For example, a semantic orienting task may require participants to rate the pleasantness of
the stimulus words. On the other hand, acoustic orienting tasks might require the
participants to decide if the stimulus word rhymes with another word. Finally, structural
orienting tasks may require the participants to determine how many syllables a stimulus
word has, or how many consonants a stimulus word has. Results from previous research
have converged on the conclusion that semantic processing leads to improvements in
frequency judgment performance as opposed to acoustic and structural processing which
are progressively less effective (eg., Greene, 1986, Exp. 3; Maki & Ostby, 1987, Exp. 1)
Hasher and Zacks (1984) concede that differing orienting tasks during encoding of
stimuli do produce differences in performance on subsequent frequency judgment tasks,
but do not view this finding as problematic for their theory of automatic encoding of
frequency information. They contend that many rating tasks such as those used to
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manipulate depth of processing induce individuals to generate internal covert rehearsals of
stimuli. As the work on internal generation of stimuli has shown, covert rehearsals can be
confused with actual stimulus presentations, causing an inflation of the presentation
frequency judgment (Johnson & Raye, 1981). However, if the depth of processing
manipulation caused participants to engage in more covert rehearsals and, thereby, caused
an inflation in their frequency judgments, one would expect to see participants
overestimating the frequency of occurrence of the stimulus items, and this does not occur
(eg. Maki & Ostby, 1987, Exp. 1 & Exp. 2; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986, Exp. 2).
Additionally, it must be noted that because researchers can never control for the number of
covert rehearsal which participants make of the stimulus words, the covert rehearsal
argument could be used to explain almost any difference in frequency judgment
performance.
In the current meta-analysis, studies manipulating depth of processing fell into two
distinct clusters. The three studies that fell into the first cluster all compared frequency
judgment performance of individuals after semantic and structural orienting tasks. Overall,
individuals performing the semantic orienting task had better frequency judgment
performance than those performing the structural orienting task. This effect is both large
and stable (i.e., the fail-safe number meets the Rosenthal's (1984) criteria).
Focused comparisons between the levels of the categorical predictor variables
merely reiterated the finding of the diffuse comparison of effect sizes (i.e., lack of
variability). None of the focused comparisons revealed differences in effect sizes due to
dependent task, dependent measure, or expected test.
However, as with the meta-analysis on the effectiveness of strategy manipulations,
there was a large, negative correlation between effect size and study list length.
Specifically, as study list length increased, the frequency judgment performance of
participants using semantic and structural encoding strategies converged. Since only a small
number of studies were included in this analysis, this effect must be interpreted with
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caution. However, the replication of the negative correlation between strategy use and
study list length lends credence to the interpretation introduced earlier that as memory
becomes maximally taxed, benefits from controlled processing strategies are attenuated.
In the second homogeneous cluster of studies manipulating levels of processing,
three of the four studies manipulated depth of processing by comparing those individuals
given a semantic orienting task at the time of encoding to those individuals given an
acoustic orienting task at the time of encoding (i.e., Jonides & Naveh-Benjamin, 1987,
Exp. 1; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986, Exp. 2; Rose & Rowe, 1976, Exp. 2). The
fourth study (Ferber, 1988) compared individuals using a semantic encoding task to those
individuals using a structural encoding task.
As opposed to the large and stable effect seen for the first cluster of studies, the
average effect for this second cluster was small and unstable. Additionally, focused
comparisons between levels of the categorical predictor variables indicated that there was
no variability in the effect sizes.
However, as was observed with the first cluster of studies, as study list length
increased, performance of the groups under acoustic and structural orienting tasks
converged. Continual replication of the negative relationship between study list length and
the benefits of processing strategies lends further support to the interpretation that when
memory becomes maximally taxed, the benefits of processing strategies are attenuated.
While the effect sizes of the three studies making semantic versus acoustic depth of
processing comparisons did not significantly differ from the study making a semantic
versus structural depth of processing comparison, the former generated an small significant
effect size and the latter generated a nonsignificant effect size. It is curious that Ferber's
(1988) semantic versus structural manipulation does not behave like the other semantic
versus structural manipulations which yielded a large, stable effect size. However, in
taking a closer look at the procedure employed by Ferber, it is fairly easy to see why this
might be the case. In the course of an experimental trial, Ferber's participants were
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required to simultaneously perform a choice reaction task, ignore irrelevant numerical
stimuli, and perform the respective orienting task on the relevant stimuli. It is highly
plausible that the complex nature of this task limited the processing capacity of the
participants in the semantic encoding condition. Other research has shown that limiting
processing capacity at the time of encoding does in fact have detrimental effects on
individuals' frequency judgment performance (eg., Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986,
Exp. 1).
Excluding the study conducted by Ferber (1988) from this second cluster, leaves
two homogeneous clusters in the meta-analysis on levels of processing which differ on the
basis of the depth of processing manipulation used. The present findings on semantic and
acoustic processing are thus consistent with the notion that semantic processing is the most
superior form of encoding for memory, with acoustic and structural encoding being
progressively less effective (Craik & Lockhart,1972). While Hasher and Zacks (1979,
1984) have attempted to dissociate the encoding of frequency of occurrence information
from controlled memory processes, the present findings suggest that the encoding of
frequency information benifits from controlled processes.
Age - Elderly
Since semantic processing leads to improved frequency judgment performance as
opposed to nonsemantic processing and since, as was pointed out earlier, both older adults
and children are less likely to engage in unprompted semantic processing (Craik &
Rabinowitz, 1985; Hasher & Clifton, 1974), it was expected that both older adults and
children would experience declines in frequency performance when compared with young
adults. This hypothesis is contrary to Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) contention that the
encoding of frequency information is invariant with respect to developmental differences.
Results of the literature addressing the effects of age of the encoding of frequency
information have been mixed (Attig & Hasher, 1980; Tweedy & Vakil, 1988).
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Consistent with the hypothesis that young older would outperform elderly adults on
the frequency judgment tasks, a small but very stable effect reflecting a decrement in
performance on the part of older adults when compared to young adults was observed.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, six of the seven studies using mean frequency as a measure
found a significant presentation frequency by age interactions which could not be included
into the current meta-analysis. It is possible, therefore, that the small, stable effect seen for
the current set of data may actually be larger.
Focused comparisons between the levels of the categorical predictor variables
revealed that there was variability in both significance levels and effect sizes. First, larger
effect sizes were seen for those studies requiring participants to perform a discrimination
task than for those studies requiring participants to perform an estimation task. Moreover,
the measure of mean correct generated significantly larger effect sizes than the measure of
correlation. Since the mean correct measure is associated only with the discrimination task
and correlation is associated only with the estimation task, the differences in dependent
tasks will be addressed first.
Discrimination tasks were originally used in paradigms with older adults because it
was thought that such tasks circumvented response bias differences between older and
younger adults which were responsible for age differences on frequency estimation tasks
(Attig & Hasher, 1980). However, response bias may also affect frequency discrimination
performance. Specifically, if older and younger adults use tdifferent subjective scales
when encoding the frequency of information, and at the time of retrieval, attempt to map
these scales onto a two-choice response, the differences between the two groups may be
maximized (Hui & Triandis, 1989) Hui and Triandis (1989) have found, for example, that
when one subgroup of a population systematically differs from another subgroup of a
population in their subjective scaling of responses, alleviating differences due to different
internal subjective scales is best accomplished by increasing, not decreasing, the number of
response alternatives. Thus, the two-choice discrimination task may actually maximize
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differences between younger and older adults if the underlying scales which older and
younger adults use to encode frequency information differ.
If the latter is a plausible explanation for the differences between frequency
discrimination and frequency estimation tasks, large differences between these two tasks
would most likely be observed in groups of individuals who are somehow different prior to
entering the experimental testing situation as opposed to groups which are randomly
assigned to different conditions once they are in the testing situation. Specifically, groups
that differ systematically prior to entering the testing session will be more likely to differ
systematically in their response scale. Hence, this could true of the older adults who are
compared with younger adults.
Problems associated with the use of measurement scales which may reflect a
response bias or extreme response style rather than true differences on the frequency
judgment task may be solved in a couple of ways. First of all, it is possible to use a
frequency estimation procedure and then subsequently determine if younger and older
adults differ in the range of responses which they use or the frequency with which they use
intervals along the response range. Thus, it is possible to directly assess if there is a
response bias mediating the performance of the older adults on the frequency estimation
task. Second, the use of a rank-order correlation between judged frequency and
presentation frequency may be used as the measure of analysis rather than mean frequency.
This measure alleviates problems associated with different subjective response scales. In
particular, this measurement is not based on absolute differences in the magnitude of
frequency judgments, but rather on the sensitivity of the individual to changes in frequency
as a function of presentation frequency (Brown, 1995).
Another way to interpret the difference in the effect sizes for the discrimination and
estimation tasks is to consider the significant presentation frequency by age interactions
which were not entered into the analysis. It is possible that had the interactions been
accounted for, the difference between the effect sizes for estimation and discrimination
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would not be quite so large. Additionally, it is also possible that the measure mean correct
is more sensitive to individuals' performance on frequency judgment tasks because it does
not allow for error as does the mean frequency estimate.
In the meta-analysis on the effect of old age, performance also depended upon the
test expectancy of the individuals. The largest differences between younger and older
adults were in the studies using general memory instructions. The average effect size of
these studies differed from those studies that used incidental memory instructions (in which
there was no difference between the frequency judgment performance of younger and older
adults). Past research has shown that older adults are less likely than younger adults to
adopt appropriate strategies when performing problem solving tasks in general (Charness,
1987). Differences in strategy adoption may be mediating the age differences in frequency
judgment performance observed under general memory instructions. It has been suggested
that under general memory instructions, younger adults are more likely than older adults to
adopt a specific processing strategy; moreover, younger adults are more likely than older
adults to guess the true nature of the upcoming memory test when the frequency
information of the study task is salient (Sanders et al., 1990). In the truly incidental
condition, the null effects of age may be due to the fact that the cover task is plausible
enough that both older adults and younger adults fail to engage in strategic processing. In
summary the finding that frequency judgment performance is not invariant with age is
inconsistent with the notion that the encoding of frequency information is an automatic
process as described by Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984).
Age - Children
While Hasher and Zacks have proposed that the encoding of frequency information
is invariant to developmental differences (1979, 1984), research investigating the effects of
a child's age has generated disparate results (Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves, 1988; Hasher &
Zacks, 1979, Exp. 1). In the current meta-analysis, unlike the studies investigating the
effect of old age, there were no overall effects of age in the studies looking at the frequency
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judgment performance of children. However, the lack of overall effects may be attributed
to differences in the types of developmental comparisons made by the primary researchers.
Specifically, larger effect sizes were generated in those studies making comparisons
between children of different ages than in those studies comparing children to young
adults. While this finding may appear to be counterintuitive, a closer look at the specific age
comparisons made by the respective researchers reveals why this is the case (see Table 23).
The majority of studies comparing children of different ages compared very young children
of kindergarten age (usually about five years of age) to children in at least the third grade
(children about eight or nine years of age). On the other hand, the studies making
developmental comparisons between children and young adults compared children who
were in at least the third grade to college students. Collectively, the effect seen for the
former comparison and the lack of effect seen for the latter comparison may reflect an
influence of language comprehension on frequency judgment performance.
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Table 23
Actual Age Comparisons Made By Primary Researchers in Meta-analysis on the Effects of
a Child's Age on Frequency Judgment Performance
Younger Group

Older Group

Significance

Kindergarten

Third Grade

Significant

Kindergarten

Third Grade

Nonsignificant

Kindergarten

Third Grade

Nonsignificant

Kindergarten

Third Grade

Significant

Kindergarten

Third Grade

Significant

Kindergarten

Fifth Grade

Nonsignificant

Kindergarten

Third Grade

Significant

6 Years Old

Nine Years Old

Nonsignificant

7 Years Old

20 Years Old

Nonsignificant

Third Grade

College Student

Nonsignificant

Fourth Grade

College Student

Nonsignificant

Study
Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Discrimination / Words
Hasher & Zacks
(1979) Exp. 1 Pictures
Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Estimation / Pictures
* Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Discrimination / Pictures
Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Estimation / Words
Lund et al. (1983) Exp. 1
Pictures
Lund et al. (1983) Exp. 2
Pictures
Goldstein, Hasher, & Stein
(1983) Exp. 1 Pictures
Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves
(1988) Exp. 1 Words
Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves
(1988) Exp. 2 Pictures
Hasher & Chromiak
(1977) Exp. 1
Words

Note. '"Identified as an outlier.
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If this were true, effect sizes should vary with the type of stimuli depending upon
the developmental comparison made. Consistent with this idea it was found that the type
of stimuli did not influence the effect sizes for these types of developmental comparisons.
However, for the comparisons of kindergarten aged children to third-grade aged children,
type of stimuli influenced the differences between the two groups. Specifically, larger
differences between the groups of younger and older children were observed when words
were used as stimuli than when pictures were used as stimuli. Since the younger children
have not had as much experience in comprehending verbal language stimuli as the older
children, it is likely that stimulus comprehension plays a role in the performance of
individuals on frequency judgment tasks. This interpretation is also suggested by the
results from the meta-analysis on cognitive ability which found that aphasics perform
poorly on frequency judgment tasks.
Larger effect sizes were again observed for the measure of mean correct than for the
measures of mean frequency and correlation. As in other analyses, the effect of the
measure mean correct is confounded with the effect of dependent task. Once again,
however, it appears that the use of mean correct as a dependent measures may maximize
differences between groups.
Results of the influence of test expectancy follow the same pattern as those seen for
the influence of type of stimuli. For those comparisons between children and young
adults, the type of test which the participant expected did not influence frequency judgment.
However, for those comparisons between children of different ages, it was found that
greater differences in the performance of younger and older children occurred when the
children were given frequency instructions than when they were given general memory
instructions. In the frequency test instruction condition, it is likely, that older children
adopted some sort of processing strategy, while the younger children did not. However, it
should be noted that all of the studies included in the meta-analysis which gave children
general memory instructions also used pictures as stimuli. Therefore, the null effects
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observed under general memory instructions could be due to the lack of frequency
judgment differences between younger and older children for the picture stimuli.
While, the overall correlation between effect sizes and list length was not
significant, this correlation did differ under various instructional conditions. Specifically,
as has been observed in other meta-analyses, under frequency test instructions, as the
length of the study list increased, the differences between the developmental groups
decreased. It might be expected that younger children would have more difficulty with
longer list lengths; however, no such differences were found.
Capacity
One of the most essential tenants of the automaticity of frequency encoding view is
that performance in encoding the frequency of occurrence of information will not be
attenuated by the addition of simultaneous controlled processing tasks which limit
processing capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984). Literature addressing this issue has
generated mixed results (Birnbaum, Taylor, Johnson, & Raye, 1987; Hasher & Zacks,
1979, Exp. 3). However, in the present analysis, studies which limit the amount of
processing capacity available for the encoding of frequency information display a moderate
effect size. This effect, though unstable, reflects decrements in the frequency judgment of
individuals as their capacity for the processing of such information is limited. Additionally,
the effect did not interact with any of the predictors.
Encoding Variability
If frequency information were encoded automatically, one would not expect such
information to benefit from contextual variability. Some studies which have investigated
the effect of encoding variability on frequency judgment performance have found that it
benefits performance (eg., Hintzman & Stern, 1978, Exp. 2), while other studies have
found that it impairs performance (eg., Brown, 1995, Exp. 1).
In the current study, it was expected that increasing the variability of encoding
episodes would enhance frequency judgment performance. However, the meta-analysis on
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the effects of encoding variability yielded nonsignificant results. Before interpreting this
null effect, it must be noted that focused comparisons revealed that the effects of encoding
variability differed depending upon the type of instructions which participants received.
For those participants expecting a frequency test, increasing the variability of the individual
encoding episodes did in fact enhance frequency judgment performance . However, for
those participants given either general memory instructions or incidental instructions,
increasing the variability of the encoding episodes actually produced a decline in frequency
judgment performance. These results suggest that when individuals are aware that they
will be tested for the frequency of occurrence of stimuli, they are able to use the variability
of the encoding episodes to enhance their frequency memory, perhaps by using the variable
contexts to enrich semantic elaboration or to aid in the counting of distinct episodes.
However, when individuals are not aware that their memory for the frequency of
occurrence of the study list words will be tested, increasing the variability of the encoding
episodes interferes with the encoding of the frequency information.
Practice
According to Hasher and Zacks' (1979, 1984) framework, as an automatic process,
the encoding of frequency information operates optimally. Therefore, practice at the
encoding of frequency information should not enhance subsequent frequency judgments.
Like research on other variables which should not influence frequency encoding, the
research on the effects of practice has not been conclusive. For example, Hockley (1984)
found that frequency estimation improved with practice, while Zacks, Hasher, and Sanft
(1982) found that frequency judgment did not improve with practice.
The findings of the meta-analysis on practice are consistent with Hasher and Zacks'
(1979, 1984) view and inconsistent with the hypothesis that there would be no overall
effect of practice on the subsequent frequency judgment performance of individuals.
Furthermore, the effects of practice did not vary with any of the categorical predictors.
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One limitation of the studies which investigate the effects of practice on frequency
judgment performance is the task which individuals practice. Specifically, these studies
administered several study-test trials to participants who expected a frequency test. When
given intentional frequency instructions, participants may attempt to count the stimulus
events. If counting is the task which is being practiced, one would not expect to see
improvements over successive practice trials since counting is already an overlearned task.
Generation
Literature on the effects of internal generation of stimulus items on the judged
presentation frequency of events has consistently agreed that increasing the number of
covert or internal rehearsals which an individual performs will inflate the subsequent
judgments of presentation frequency for that item. Likewise, Hasher and Zacks (1984)
have conceded that inflation of judged frequency does occur as a result of internal
generation of stimulus items.
In the current meta-analysis it was found, as hypothesized, that increasing the
number of times an individual internally generates a stimulus item, increases subsequent
judgments of presentation frequency. This effect is large and stable, especially considering
that there were only three studies included in the meta-analysis. Moreover, this effect did
not vary as a function of any of the predictor variables, categorical or continuous.
As Hasher and Zacks (1984) have pointed out, the effect of internal generation of
stimulus items on judged frequency does not necessarily pose problems for their contention
that the encoding of frequency information is an automatic process. However, as was
pointed out earlier, in any frequency paradigm, researchers cannot control for the number
of covert rehearsals which an individual makes of the stimulus items. Therefore, the
possibility always exists that covert rehearsals made by individuals inflate their subsequent
frequency performance.

CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusions
The Encoding of Frequency Information as an Automatic Process
The primary controversy addressed in the current investigation is whether the
encoding of frequency information is in fact an automatic process as Hasher and Zacks
(1979, 1984) have proposed. Meta-analyses conducted on those variables developed from
the criteria for automaticity generally do not support the idea that frequency encoding
occurs automatically.
For a concise depiction of the overall results of the individual meta-analyses refer to
Table 24. Results which have the strongest implications for the encoding of frequency as
an automatic process were obtained in the meta-analyses of those studies manipulating
individuals' encoding strategies, in the meta-analysis of studies making developmental
comparisons in elderly adults, and in the meta-analysis of studies manipulating the
encoding capacity of individuals. Specifically, the stable effect sizes observed in these
studies indicate that (a) the frequency information encoded when different processing
strategies are used is better than the frequency information encoded when no processing
strategies, or less beneficial processing strategies, are used, (b) the encoding of frequency
information is not invariant to developmental differences later in life, and (c) limiting the
encoding capacity of individuals attempting to encode frequency information interferes with
this encoding. Collectively these results indicated that the encoding of frequency
information both benefits from the addition of controlled processing strategies and uses
processing capacity as controlled processes do.
Advocates of the view that frequency information is automatically encoded may
claim that the breadth of this controlled component is qualified by the meta-analyses on the
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effects of encoding variability and practice. In particular, these meta-analyses indicate that
(a) practice at the encoding of frequency information does not improve performance and (b)
unless one is intentionally encoding frequency information, variability of the encoding
episodes actually elicits deficits in frequency judgment performance. However, both of
these issues are more complex than they appear. First, it has been pointed out that practice
at counting would not be expected to enhance frequency performance. Second, participants
who are intentionally encoding frequency under variable encoding conditions are likely to
use the variability to their advantage in counting the stimulus events. However, those not
given intentional frequency instructions in variable encoding conditions must rely on the
distinctiveness of the memory trace, which depending upon the strategy adopted by the
participants at encoding, may or may not actually be distinctive.
The present findings are thus more consistent with a view proposed by Sanders,
Gonzalez, Murphy, Liddle, and Vitina (1990). Sanders and his colleagues have advocated
the adoption of a non-optimal view of the automatic processing of frequency information
that appears to fit the current results. This non-optimal view of the automaticity of
frequency encoding contends that while very little processing capacity is necessary for
greater than chance performance in the judgment of frequency, additional processing
resources allotted to the task of frequency encoding can improve frequency judgment
performance.
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Table 24
Typical Effect Sizes and Significance Levels for Each of the Meta-Analvses Investigating
Criteria for the Automaticity of Frequency Encoding as Established by Hasher and Zacks
(1979. 1984)

Analysis

N

ZeO'ect

d

Zsig

E

FSN

FSN C

Cognitive Ability

12

0.10

0.20

1.98

.02

15

70

Test expectancy

26

0.06

0.16

3.11

.00

70

140

Strategy

4

0.42

0.87

5.20

.00

54

30

Cluster One

3

0.64

1.88

6.62

.00

39

25

Cluster Two

4

0.14

0.28

2.61

.00

5

30

Elderly

27

0.16

0.31

7.20

.00

360

145

Children

10

0.10

0.19

1.53

.06

NA

NA

Capacity

10

0.32

0.65

6.57

.00

161

60

Encoding Variability

12

0.00

0.00

0.37

.35

NA

NA

Practice

4

0.05

0.11

0.53

.30

NA

NA

Generation

3

0.57

1.2

5.65

.00

31

25

Levels of Processing

Age

Note: "N" denotes the number of studies included in the final meta-anlaysis, "d" denotes
Cohen's d for effect size, "Z" denotes the combined significance level, "p" denotes the
probability associated with the combined significance level, "FSN" denotes the fail-safe
number, "FSNC" denotes Rosenthal's (1984) criteria for the fail-safe number.
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Representation of Frequency in Memory
Although the main focus of the current study was not on the underlying
representation of frequency in memory, a non-optimal view of the automaticity of
frequency encoding is consistent with certain theories of the representation of frequency in
memory. The first of these theories suggests frequency information may be represented in
memory in more than one way (Howell, 1973). Specifically, Howell (1973) has
described a multiple-process model of frequency encoding. According to this model,
frequency information is represented by a frequency attribute, not unlike that described by
Begg (1974), which increases in strength as the frequency of occurrence increases.
Additionally, frequency can also be represented by multiple contextually tagged memory
traces, as described by (Hintzman, 1971). The unique frequency attribute may be
associated with automatic encoding of frequency information. However, the encoding the
multiple contextually tagged traces may not be automatict. An alternative view (Hintzman,
1985) is that minimal attention is required during encoding for the event to be stored in
memory; however, the ability to retrieve these memory traces can either be degraded by
interference during encoding, or they can be enhanced by semantic elaboration during
encoding.
Implications
The current meta-analysis has identified several methodological problems in the
measuring of frequency judgment performance that have practical implications which are
not as easily discovered in primary research investigations. The first of these problems is
the use of mean frequency as a measure of frequency sensitivity. The disadvantage of
using mean frequency as a measure in detecting effects was witnessed across metaanalyses, including meta-analyses in which the individual studies using mean frequency as
a measure did not produce significant interactions. It is suggested that the use of regression
slope and correlational measures which indicate individuals' relative sensitivity to changes
in presentation frequency be used.
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Additionally, the current meta-analysis has raised a question concerning the use of
discrimination tasks as a measure of frequency sensitivity. Large group differences
observed in the task of frequency discrimination may be indicative of problems in
accurately mapping the participants' subjective internal scale to the external scale. (Hui &
Triandis, 1989). Additional research in this area is needed.
Finally, across meta-analyses, it was found that longer study list lengths attenuate
the benefits of strategical processing. Therefore, when creating study lists, future
researchers must take care to ensure that they are not so long as to obscure the effects of the
variables of interest.
Problems and Limitations
Several problems were encountered throughout the process of conducting the
current meta-analysis. First, studies for which the appropriate statistical information was
unobtainable were not included in the analyses. While other meta-analytic researchers of
larger literature areas have no qualms in eliminating studies from the analyses (eg., Mullen
& Cooper, 1994), as a result of the small frequency literature base, studies were excluded
from the current meta-analysis with great reservation. Furthermore, several studies
manipulated or analyzed the independent variables in such a way that the data could not be
fit to the framework of any of the current meta-analyses (eg., Kausler & Hakami, 1982).
While, it is believed that the major implications of the current study for the automaticity of
frequency encoding would not be changed if the excluded studies had been included in the
analysis, it is highly likely that results based upon focused comparisons of the levels of the
predictor variables would be changed by the inclusion of excluded studies. While these
problems may be encountered in all meta-analyses, they have greater implications for metaanalyses conducted in small literature areas such as the frequency literature area.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for a body of
literature in which there is no publication bias.
Figure 2. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for a body of
literature in which there is a bias for the publication of significant results.
Figure 3. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on cognitive ability.
Figure 4. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on intention.
Figure 5. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on the effects of strategy manipulations.
Figure 6. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on levels of processing.
Figure 7. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on age-elderly.
Figure 8. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on age-children.
Figure 9. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on capacity.
Figure 10. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on encoding variability.
Figure 11. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on the effects of practice.
Figure 12. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) plotted as a function of sample size for those studies
included in the meta-analysis on the effects of internal generation of stimuli.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Coded Numerical Values Associated With the Levels of Each Categorical Predictor
Included in All Meta-Analvses

Predictor

Dependent Task

Dependent Measure

Expected Test

Stimuli

Level of Predictor

Numerical Value

Discrimination

1

Estimation

2

Number Correct / Incorrect

1

Mean Frequency

2

Correlation / Slope

4

Median Frequency

5

Frequency

1

General Memory

2

Incidental

3

Native Language Words

1

Pictures or Figures

2

Nonsense Syllables

3
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Table A2
Coded Numerical Values Associated With the Levels of Categorical Predictors Specific to
Certain Meta-Analvses

Predictor

Cognitive Ability

Level of Predictor

Numerical Values

Retardation

1

Closed Head Injured

2

Parkinson's Disease

3

Apashic Patients

4

Frontal Lobectomy

5

Detoxified Alcoholics

6

Expected Test

Frequency vs. General Memory

1

Manipulation

Frequency vs. Incidental

2

Incidental vs. General Memory

3

Strategy

Semantic Vs. Counting

1

Comparison

Repetition Vs. Imagery

2

Free Vs. Restricted Rehearsal

3

Counting Vs. None

4

Semantic vs. Acoustic

1

Semantic vs. Structural

2

Developmental

Child Vs. Child

1

Comparison

Child Vs. College Student

2

Levels of Processing

121

Capacity Limitation

Practice

Alcohol Intoxication

1

Depression

2

Arithmetic Task

3

Tone Monitoring

4

Case Monitoring

5

Multiple Lists Same Day

2

Multiple Lists Across Days

3
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Table A3
Formulas for the Transformation of Inferential Statistics into Zs

Statistic

Formula

Z = (df(log( 1 + (t 2 / df)))) 1 / 2 (1 - (1 / (2dl))) 1 / 2
E(l,df)

Z = (df(log(l + (F/ df)))) 1 / 2 (1 - (1 / ( 2 d 0 ) ) 1 / 2
Z = X2
t = (r(N - 2) 1 / 2 ) / (1 - r 2 ) 1 / 2 then use formula for t
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Table A4
Formulas for the Transformation of Inferential Statistics into rs

Statistic

Formula

t

r = [t2/(t2 + df)]1/2

F(l,df)

r= [F/(F+df)]1/2

X 2 (D

r = (X2/N)l/2

Z

r=(Z2/N)1/2

Table A5
Computation of Coefficients for Linear Orthogonal Polynomial Contrasts Assuming Unequal Intervals and Unequal Sample Sizes

Value of

Linear

Coded Predictor

Sample

Study

Mean Age (Xj)

Size (nj)

njcij = n j a j + njXj

1

10

42

42c 11 =42a \ +42( 10)

cn=-3778/140+10

= -16.98

2

21

36

36ci2=36ai+36(21)

c

12--3778/140+21

= -5.98

3

23

34

34ci3=34ai+34(23)

ci3=-3778/140+23

= -3.98

4

65

28

28ci4=28ai+28(65)

ci4=-3778/140+65

= 38.0

Since 2njcij=0,

Coefficients

0 = 140ai+3778
ai = -3778/140

q j = ai+Xj

Appendix B
Table B1
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Meta-analysis on Cognitive Ability

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z=0

4

Z=3.9

48

+

t=1.5(110)

48

(1988) Exp. 2

t=. 11(203)

Nichelli et al (1994)

Z

p

d

TASK DM

AM

ET

ST

List

.50

0

2

1

1

2

1

150

3.9

4.82E-05

1.36

2

1

1

2

2

150

+

1.49

.06

.29

2

4

1

1

1

163

60

+

.11

.46

.02

2

4

1

2

2

70

t=2.26(30)

32

-

-2.15

.98

-.82

2

4

3

2

1

90

Schuckitt (1986)

z=0

5

1

+

0

.50

0

2

2

6

2

1

174

Smith & Milner (1988)

Z=0

9

6

+

0

.50

0

2

2

5

2

2

80

Ellis & Allison (1988)
Words

8

+

0

Ellis & Allison (1988)
Pictures
Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves
(1988) Exp. 1
Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves

Salmon, Butters, &

Vakil et al (1994)

9

.50

0

2

2

2

1

60

2

2.41

.008

.93

1

1

4

0

60

4

+

2.70

.003

1.44

1

1

4

1

93

4

+

1.07

.14

.52

2

4

1

1

80

1

-1.10

.86

-.53

2

4

1

2

80

1

Z=0

2

+

F=6.52(30)

30

+

F=9.3(18)

20

t=l.l(18)

20

t= 1.14(18)

20

0

Wiegersma et al
(1988) Exp. 1
Wiegersma et al
(1988) Exp. 2
Woodley-Zanthos &
Ellis (1989) Words
Woodley-Zanthos &
Ellis (1989) Pictures

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (+indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
levels, p = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d , , TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent
measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length, AM = ability manipulation. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the
variable was manipulated in that study.
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Table B2
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Intention Meta-analysis

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

g

d

TASK DM

ETM

ST

LIST

Attig & Hasher (1981)

F= 1.72(90)

96

+

1.3

.09

.28

1

1

1

1

90

*Challis (1993) Exp. 1

F=52.53(46)

72

+

5.89

2.40E-09

2.14

2

2

2

1

116

Z=0

80

+

0

.5

0

2

2

2

1

106

(1985) Discrimination

Z=0

80

+

0

.5

0

1

1

2

1

106

Flexser & Bower (1975)

t=.81(18)

20

-

.19

.21

.38

2

4

1

3

117

Greene (1984) Exp. 1

F= 10.39(30) 32

+

2.96

.001

1.18

2

4

3

1

96

Greene (1984) Exp. 2

F=3.81(51)

36

+

1.91

.02

.55

2

4

2

1

98

Greene (1986) Exp. 1

t=.02(33)

36

+

.01

.49

.006

2

1

2

1

96

Z=0

40

+

0

.5

0

2

2

2

1

204

Erickson & Gaffney
(1985) Estimation
Erickson & Gaffney

Harris, Begg, & Mitterer
(1980) Exp. 1

Harris, Begg, & Mitterer
(1980) Exp. 2

Z=0

4

t=1.04(45)

32

F=7.82(152)

160

(1978) Exp. 2

Z=0

Howell (1973a)

0

+

0

0

2

2

2

1

290

Hasher et al
(1987) Exp. 4

-1.03

.85

-.31

2

2

2

2

80

+

2.76

.002

.45

2

5

1

1

70

80

+

0

.5

0

2

2

1

1

70

F=.02(88)

96

+

.14

.44

.03

2

2

1

1

0

Z=0

48

+

0

.5

0

1

1

2

1

81

Hakami (1984) Exp. 2

F=3.64(44)

48

+

1.86

. 03

.58

1

1

1

81

Kausler & Puckett (1980)

Z=0

32

+

0

.5

0

1

1

1

1

81

z=o

96

+

0

.5

0

1

1

1

1

81

F=. 13(113)

117

+

.36

.36

.06

2

4

2

1

168

Hasher & Chromiak
(1977) Exp. 1
Hasher & Zacks

Kausler, Lichty, &
Hakami (1984) Exp. 1
Kausler, Lichty, &
2

Kausler, Wright, &
Hakami (1981)
Naveh-Benjamin &
Jonides (1986) Exp. 2

Naveh-Benjamin &
Jonides (1986) Exp. 3

tp. 58(18)

20

+

.57

.28

.27

2

4

1

1

168

t=.30(141)

96

+

.30

.38

.05

2

2

1

1

327

t=2.75(30)

32

+

2.58

.005

1.00

1

1

2

2

60

(1987) Exp. 2

t=1.62(23)

25

+

1.56

.05

.66

1

1

2

2

60

Whinery (1986)

Z=0

80

+

0

.50

0

1

1

3

1

116

Williams (1986) Exp. 2

Z=0

32

+

0

.5

0

2

4

1

1

54

F=2.54(165)

144

+

1.59

.06

.25

1

1

1

1

90

Rose and Rowe
(1976) Exp. 1
Sanders et al
(1987) Exp. 1
Sanders et al

Zacks, Hasher, &
Sanft (1982)

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (+indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction)
DM = Dependent Measure, ETM = expected test manipulation, ST = Stimuli. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the variable
manipulated in that study.
* Identified as an outlier.

Table

A5

Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Strategy Meta-analysis

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

U

d

TASK DM

STR

ET

ST

L

Greene (1986) Exp. 3

t=4.00(45)

32

+

3.67

1.17E-04

1.19

2

4

1

1

1

100

t=4.79(38)

40

+

4.21

1.29E-05

1.55

2

4

2

0

1

80

F=5.29(88)

90

+

2.26

1.19E-02

.49

2

5

3

2

1

114

F=5.89(30)

32

+

2.30

1.07E-02

.89

1

1

4

1

1

90

Naveh-Benjamin &
Jonides (1985)
Proctor &
Ambler (1975) Exp. 2
Zacks, Hasher, &
Sanft (1982) Exp. 2

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (-^indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
levels, p = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d , , TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent
measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length, SM = strategy manipulation. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that
M
the variable was manipulated in that study.
o

Table B4
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Levels of Processing Meta-Analysis

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

g

d

TASK DM

ET

ST

LIST

F=5.17(15)

16

+

2.07

.01

1.17

1

1

2

1

168

Exp. 1 Estimation

F=9.36(15)

16

+

2.65

.00

1.58

2

4

2

1

168

+Challis (1993) Exp. 1

F=52.53(46)

72

+

5.89

.00

2.14

2

2

3

1

116

t=2.01(58)

60

+

1.97

.02

.53

2

4

1

1

115

F=7.29(113)

117

+

2.65

.00

.51

2

4

0

1

96

Exp. 2

^0-3(141)

96

+

.30

.38

.05

2

2

3

1

327

++Ferber (1988)

t=0.08(79)

60

-.07

.53

-.01

2

4

3

1

288

+Maki & Ostby (1987)
Exp. 1 Discrimination
+Maki & Ostby (1987)

++Jonides &
Naveh-Benjamin
(1987) Exp. 1
++Naveh-Benjamin &
Jonides (1986) Exp. 2
++Rose & Rowe (1976)

* Erickson &
Gaffney (1985)

t=9.2(38)

40

-6.62

1

-2.98 2

2

0

1

106

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (+indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction)
DM = Dependent Measure, ET = expected test, ST = Stimuli. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the variable was manipulated in that
study.
^Identified as an outlier.
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Table B5
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Age - Elderly Meta-analysis

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

g

d

TASK DM

ET

ST

LIST

F= 14.5(126)

128

+

3.70

1.09E-04

.68

2

4

2

2

92

Words

F=6.71(126)

128

+

2.55

5.35E-03

.46

2

4

2

92

Attig & Hasher (1980)

F=3.43(62)

64

+

1.82

.03

.47

1

1

0

90

Z=1.65

48

-1.65

.95

-.49

2

4

1

1

180

Z=.43

48

+

.43

.33

.12

2

4

1

1

163

Z=.08

60

+

.08

.47

.02

2

4

2

2

70

F=.8(58)

60

+

.12

.19

.23

2

2

1

1

150

Attig (1981)
Pictures
Attig (1981)

Brown, Niinikoski, &
Duke (1993) Exp. 1
Ellis, Palmer, &
Reeves (1988) Exp. 1
Ellis, Palmer, &
Reeves (1988) Exp. 2
Freund & Witte
(1986) Exp. 1

Freund & Witte
(1986) Exp. 2

F=2.00(54)

60

+

1.39

.08

.38

2

2

1

F=5.72(106)

108

+

2.35

9.26E-03

.46

1

1

2

(1979) Exp. 2

Z=0

80

+

0

.5

0

2

4

0

Kausler & Hakami (1982)

Z=0

26

+

0

.5

0

2

2

2

F= 10.97(66)

72

+

3.17

7.52E-04

.81

1

1

0

Hakami (1984) Exp. 2

F=5.66(44)

48

+

2.29

.01

.72

1

1

0

Kausler & Puckett (1980)

Z=0

32

+

0

.5

0

t=2.32(230)

156

+

2.30

. 01

.31

1

1

1

F= 12.33(88)

96

+

3.39

3.53E-04

.75

1

1

0

E=4.65(68)

72

+

2.11

.01

.52

2

4

2

Fruend & Witte
(1986) Exp. 3
Hasher & Zacks

Kausler, Lichty, &
Hakami (1984) Exp. 1
Kausler, Lichty, &

1

1

0

Kausler, Salthouse, &
Saults (1987)
Kausler, Wright, &
Hakami (1981)
Mutter & Goedert (1996)
Estimation

1

140

Mutter & Goedert (1996)
Discrimination

F=2.02(68)

72

+

1.41

,07

.34

1

1

2

1

140

Ozekes & Gilleard (1989)

Z=0

80

+

0

,5

0

2

2

3

2

54

Sanders et al (1990)

t=.91(46)

48

-

-.90

.81

-.27

1

1

3

1

0

Tweedy & Vakil (1988)

Z=0

70

+

0

.5

0

2

2

0

1

72

Warren & Mitchell

Z=0

80

+

0

.5

0

2

2

2

1

81

F=5.08(76)

40

+

2.21

.01

.52

1

1

2

3

125

Z=0

40

+

0

.5

0

1

1

2

1

125

t=3.25(28)

30

+

2.97

.00

1.22

2

4

3

3

101

Howard (1994) Exp. 2

F=4.67(46)

48

+

2.09

.02

.64

1

1

2

3

125

Zehr (1983) Exp. 1

Z=0

100

+

0

.5

0

2

2

2

1

80

Wiggs (1993) Exp. 1
Ideograms
Wiggs (1993) Exp. 1
Verbal
*Wiggs, Martin, &
Howard (1994) Exp. 1
Wiggs, Martin, &

u>
Ui

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect ^indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction) DM = Dependent Measure, ET = expected test,
ST = Stimuli. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the variable was manipulated in that study.
* Identified as an outlier.
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Table B6
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Age-Children Meta-analysis

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

p

d

TASK DM

COM ET

ST

L

Z=.20

48

+

.20

.42

.06

2

4

3

1

1

163

Z=.ll

60

+

.11

.46

.02

2

4

4

2

2

70

1.645

12

+

1.645 .05

1.08

1

1

1

1

1

70

t=2.32(10)

12

+

2.02

.02

1.47

2

5

1

1

1

70

t=.24(10)

12

-.23

.59

-.15

2

1

5

1

2

70

Z=0

4

.5

0

2

2

2

2

2

70

Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves
(1988) Exp. 1 Children
Ellis, Palmer, & Reeves
(1988) Exp. 2 Children
Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Words-Discrimination
Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Words - Estimation
Ghatala & Levin (1973)
Pictures - Estimation
* Goldstein, Hasher, &
Stein (1983) Exp. 1

2

+

0

Hasher & Chromiak
(1977) Exp. 1

Z=0

80

+

0

.50

0

0

40

+

0

.5

0

2

2

1

2

2

70

Lund et al (1983) Exp. 1

53

+

1.09

.13

.25

1

1

1

1

2

78

Lund etal (1983) Exp. 2

40

+

2.61

.004

.89

1

1

1

1

2

54

0

70

Hasher & Zacks
(1979) Exp. 1

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (+indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
levels, p = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d , , TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent
measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length, COM = age comparison. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the
variable was manipulated in that study.
* Identified as an outlier.
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Table B8
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Meta-analysis onEncodingVariability

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

p

d

TASK DM

AT

ET

ST

List

F=6.34(46)

48

+

2.42

.008

.74

2

4

1

2

1

108

(1987) Exp. 3

F=9.37(46)

48

+

2.90

.001

.90

2

2

1

3

48

Ferber (1988)

t=. 16(79)

60

+

.16

.44

.03

2

4

4

3

388

Z=0

1

.50

0

2

2

2

2

2

72

F= 19.92(88)

96

+

4.23

1.20E-05

. 95

1

1

5

0

1

81

Z=1.645

54

+

1.65

.05

.46

2

2

3

2

1

90

Z=0

7

.50

0

1

1

3

2

1

140

Study

Birnbaum et al
(1987) Exp. 1
Birnbaum et al

Hasher & Zacks
(1979) Exp. 3

6

+

0

Kausler, Wright, &
Hakami (1981)
Maki & Ostby
(1987) Exp. 3
Mutter & Goedert
(1996) Discrimation

2

+

0

Mutter & Goedert
(1996) Estimation

F= 15.64(68) 72

+

3.74

9.28E-05

.96

2

4

3

2

1

140

20

+

3.08

.001

1.70

2

4

3

2

1

157

F= 14.04(24) 26

+

3.29

5.01E-04

1.52

1

1

4

3

2

0

Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides
(1986) Exp. 1

£3.6(18)

Sanders et al
(1987) Exp. 3

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (-vindicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
levels, p = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d , , TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent
measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length, AN = ancillary task. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the
variable was manipulated in that study.
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Table B8
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Meta-analysis on Encoding Variability

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

E

d

TASK DM

ET

ST

List

Discrimination

F=5.30(57)

60

+

2.24

.01

.61

2

2

0

1

180

Brown (1995) Exp. 1

t=3.00(38)

40

-

-2.82

.99

-.97

2

4

2

1

260

Brown (1995) Exp. 2

t=4.50(58)

50

-

-4.14 .99

-1.18 2

4

2

1

260

Brown (1995) Exp. 3

F=9.7( 144)

150

+

3.06

.001

.52

2

4

2

1

260

t= 1.78(68)

75

+

1.75

.03

.43

2

4

3

1

155

(1978) Exp. 2

t=2.33(93)

97

-

-2.29 .99

-.48

2

4

3

1

155

Jacoby (1972)

Z=0

108

-

0

.50

0

2

2

2

1

136

t=2.15(42)

45

+

2.08

.01

.66

2

4

1

1

141

Study

Begg, Maxwell, Mitterer,
& Harris (1986) Exp. 1

Hintzman & Stern
(1978) Exp. 1
Hintzman & Stern

Jonides & Naveh-Benjamin
(1987) Exp. 3

.48

.31

.19

2

4

2

1

156

48

-2.11

.98

-.64

2

2

3

1

267

F= 1.34(156)

80

-1.15

.88

-.19

2

2

2

1

62

Z=0

32

0

.50

0

2

4

2

1

54

Penney & Balsom (1993)

tp.49(27)

33

Rose (1980) Exp. 1

F=4.75(46)

(1975) Exp. 1
Williams 1986 Exp. 1

+

Voss, Vereb, & Bisanz

+

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (-vindicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
levels, g = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d , , TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent
measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the variable was manipulated
in that study.

Table

A5

Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Meta-analysis on Practice

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

E

d

TASK DM

PM

ET

ST

List

Broyles (1988) Exp. 1

Z=0

20

+

0

.50

0

2

1

3

1

1

64

Z=0

120

+

0

.50

0

2

4

2

1

1

163

F=3.2(38)

40

+

1.74

.04

.58

2

5

2

1

1

70

£=2.15(22)

24

-

-2.02

.98

-.91

1

1

2

1

1

90

Z=0

32

+

0

.50

0

1

1

2

1

1

90

Ellis, Palmer, &
Reeves (1988) Exp. 1
Hasher & Chromiak
(1977) Exp. 2
Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft
(1982) Exp. 1
Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft
(1982) Exp. 2

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (+indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
—
i>
levels, g = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d, TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent^

measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length, PM = practice manipulation. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that
the variable was manipulated in that study.

Table B8
Effect Sizes and Coded Predictors for Study Outcomes Included in Meta-analysis onEncodingVariability

Study

Statistic(df)

N

DOE

Z

U

d

TASK DM

ET

ST

List

Duke (1993) Exp. 2

F=29.16(56)

60

+

4.82

7.29E-07

1.44

2

2

2

1

180

Greene (1988) Exp. 1

F=5.32(38)

40

+

2.22

.01

.75

1

1

2

1

100

Johnson et al (1979)

t=2.83(14)

16

+

2.47

.006

1.51

2

2

2

2

72

Brown, Niinikoski, &

Note. DOE = Direction of Effect (+indicates expected direction, - indicates unexpected direction), Z = Z associated with combined significance
levels, p = significance levels associated with the Z of combined significance levels, d = Cohen's d , , TASK = dependent task, DM = dependent
measure, ET = expected test, ST = stimuli, LIST = study list length. An entry of "0" for a predictor indicates that the variable was manipulated
in that study.
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Appendix C
Table CI
Effects of Study List Length on Significance Levels and Effect Sizes for each of the MetaAnalyses: Focused Comparisons and Correlations

Meta-Analysis

Zsignificance

Zeffect

r

Cognitive Ability

1.23(2=. 13)

0.69(2= .25)

.10

Expected Test

0.17(2=.43)

0.69(p= .25)

.13

Strategy

1.02(g=. 15)

2.09(p= .01)

-.84

Semantic vs. Structural

2.87(p=.00)

1.25(p= .11)

-.91

Cluster Two

21.7(p=.01)

2.15(2= .01)

.96

0.87(p=. 19)

0.81(2= .21)

2.45(p=.00)

1.96(2= .02)

Within General Memory Expectancy 1.83 (2=. 00)

1.63(2= .05)

.44

0.86(p=.20)

1.25(2= .11)

-.24

Within Child vs. Child Comparison

1.41(p=.07)

7.94(2= .07)

-.31

Within Child vs. Adult Comparison

0.11(2=.45)

0.12(2= .45)

.87

Within Frequency Test Expectancy

1.34(p=.08)

1.81(2= .03)

-.46

2.98(2=.00)

2.82(2= .00)

.48

Within General Memory Expectancy 1.58(2=.05)

1.53(2= .06)

.29

Encoding Variability

0.14(p=.44)

0.46(2= .32)

.07

Practice

0.35(p=.36)

0.25(2= .40)

-.23

Generation

1.91(p=.02)

0.26(2= .40)

.19

Levels of Processing

Age-Elderly
Within Frequency Test Expectancy

Age-Children

Capacity

Note, "r" denotes the correlation between Cohen's d and study list length

.14
.59

